Middle East

The New York Times today has a harrowing and brutal portrait of Yemen’s own version of the Untouchable class, the Akhdam- servants- a dark-skinned, shunned class who barely scrape by a slum-dwelling non-existence sweeping streets and begging.

 Quoting Robert Worth (who has done some interesting work of late on this vital but n
neglected country):

SANA, Yemen — By day, they sweep the streets of the Old City, ragged, dark-skinned men in orange jump suits. By night, they retreat to fetid slums on the edge of town.

They are known as “Al Akhdam” — the servants. Set apart by their African features, they form a kind of hereditary caste at the very bottom of Yemen’s social ladder.

Degrading myths pursue them: they eat their own dead, and their women are all prostitutes. Worst of all, they are reviled as outsiders in their own country, descendants of an Ethiopian army that is said to have crossed the Red Sea to oppress Yemen before the arrival of Islam.

“We are ready to work, but people say we are good for nothing but servants; they will not accept us,” said Ali Izzil Muhammad Obaid, a 20-year-old man who lives in a filthy Akhdam shantytown on the edge of this capital. “So we have no hope.”

Now, there is no proof at all that they come from a pre-Islamic invasion, but that difficult myth has continued to plague them.  There indeed is much confusion as to their origin, but the idea that they are remnants of an ancient expeditionary force who stayed behind to muck around in gutters is an absurd and self-perpetuating myth. 

One of the biggest problems the Akhdam have is that, in addition to dealing with spurious legends, the government has a million other problems to deal with.  Yes, they are the poorest in Yemen- but there isn’t much of a mobile upper class among the Arabs of the country, anyway.   There is already a lot of grumbling about daily life, and for President Saleh to wage a campaign to help “outsiders” would be an act of political folly. 

But: perhaps we are looking at this with tear-colored glasses, instead of seeing the brighter side of the picture.  Yemen Times?

IIn Yemen, there is a minority of people with dark complexion called al-Akhdam. Historically speaking, their presence in Yemen has been a result of the Ethiopian pre- Islam invasion in 525 BC. Settling down in Yemen and throughout the years have adapted a life style in which they practice many trades especially folklore dancing, handicrafts, cleaning and some other free trades. Unofficial statistics show that the population of this minority reaches 500,000 inhabitants living in Sana’a, Shabowa, Lahj, Abyan, Aden and al-Hudaida.

Well- that doesn’t sound so bad.  These people have folklore. 

I don’t mean to make light (well, kind of, but only at the Yemen Times).  What that article does show is the ingrained prejudice (see the myth asserted as fact) and the somewhat rosy picture it paints, both institutional obstacles to progress. 

Things are bad for many in Yemen.  Things are horrible for the servants.  I would recommend highly Worth’s piece, and look at the accompanying slide show.  

Side note: The Yemen Timeslater ran this letter, which I hope shows that while the problem of the Akhdam might be institutionalized, it isn’t all-pervasive.

So there is going to be a total eclipse of the moon tonight, which is pretty cool, even if you are not into astronomy.    Light bending around the earth coats the moon in an dark red glow; we bathe it with our shadow- just one of the bizarre tricks the universe can play on us.

 I bring this up because the last time I saw one- May 4th, 2004- I was living in Yemen.  I was pretty excited by it then, too, because I guess I am a nerd when it comes to those things.   Greg Johnsen and I, along with our friend Sam, grabbed a few non-alcoholic beers (we were in Yemen, after all), and went into the backyard to watch it. 

It started slow, of course, and we sat with the ancient rhythms of the galaxy.  But then something not-as-ancient, but weirdly anachronistic started.  The call to prayer began to go off, from one direction and then another, crashing all around us, cutting into the stillness of the night, amplified across the reddening moon. 

There had been another call to prayer added for the night.  None of us were really sure why, exactly, and when we asked the next day never received a clear answer.   There were vague jokes about people being scared, and some answers about worshiping the wonders of creation, but nothing concrete.

And I guess it doesn’t matter.  It was a wierd bending of time that might only happen in the Middle East.  Sitting there, looking at the deadening and mysterious moon, hearing the ancient call to prayer, sounding the same as it had throughout dusty and tumultuous centuries, one could feel time stop: regress.   It bent into itself.  We could feel ourselves in the 7th century, looking up at a terrifying sky, with only the comfort of gorgeous Arabic repeating the simple words: there is no god but god.   Modern science couldn’t- can’t?- penetrate that tautological elegance.    There is a consistency there- as beautiful and terrifying and implacable as a shadow moving through the murky cosmos.   

Jamestown has two new pieces on Yemen out today, one by one of America’s foremost experts on terrorism, and another by the sharpest young Yemeni scholar out there.

The latter, by Gregory Johnsen, analyzes al-Qaeda’s new strategy in their attacks.

Over the past six months, al-Qaeda in Yemen’s strategy has become increasingly clear. It aims to strike at both Yemen and Western countries—particularly the United States—by attacking them at their most vital and vulnerable points: oil and tourism. For Yemen the danger is clear. Oil revenues account for roughly 75 percent of the nation’s budget, while tourism remains one of the few legitimate areas of growth for an economy that is headed for failure. But this strategy is also calculated to hurt the West by targeting Western citizens and striking at oil production in the Arabian Peninsula. No longer is there a clear distinction, at least for al-Qaeda in Yemen, between attacking what is often referred to as the near enemy or the far enemy; instead it has devised an approach to simultaneously attack both. This strategy—which is more overarching than it is detailed—also allows for fighters to remain in Yemen instead of traveling to Iraq or Afghanistan, which is effectively decentralizing the front.

Johnsen’s thesis is dead-on, and his reccomendations are sharp.   I may be baised, as Gregory is a good friend and frequent collaborator, but I wouldn’t be friends with a dummy. 

The other article is by Michael “Anonymous” Scheuer.   Scheuer’s article, while swimming with quotes, is a little off- or, if not off, then somewhat behind the times.  Consider:

Attacks by al-Qaeda in Yemen are likely to continue at a level that does not lead to an all-out confrontation with Salih’s regime. In all likelihood, al-Qaeda intends to cause just enough sporadic damage to persuade Salih’s regime that it is best to curtail its efforts to destroy al-Qaeda and to allow the group to operate relatively freely in and from Yemen as long as no major attacks are staged in the country. Indeed, such a modus vivendi may be in the works as San’a officials have experimented with putting imprisoned Islamists through a reeducation process that shows them the error of their ways and then releases them on the promise of good behavior (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 21, 2006).

This was the strategy of the government, and the strategy of Al-Qaeda old Yemeni guard.  The new generation is far, far less willing to compromise with the government.  Scheuer’s article is helpful as background, but it needs to be augmented with more recent developments. 
The Yemen Post has an interesting interview with a leader of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Rashad Mohammaed Saeed Ismael.   It is somewhat illuminating at times, as his irritation at the new guard sometimes bubbles to the surface, but it is also chock-full of nonsense like this:

YP: What is the source of strength in Al-Qaeda?

RI: The movement drives much of its force from its deep-rooted principles.

YP: From where does Al-Qaeda’s financial support come?

RI: Al-Qaeda has a complicated web that has no end or beginning. 

Thanks!

While we are here, it is worth reading Robert Worth’s New York Times article on Yemen.  It is old, but I will link to it from the Yemen Post.  I thought it was excellent.

In the current Yemen Times, Hassan al-Haifi has a short editorial on the need for change in the Arab World.   I link to it for a couple of reasons.  One, basically, is that it is always interesting to read critical articles in the mainstream Arab press.  We tend to think that no one is allowed to speak their mind, that the press marches in lockstep with the ruler- and, by and large, this can be true, depending on the country.  There are ways to work around that, though, and Yemen for one actually has a lively and active opposition press.   It is still verbotento criticize President Ali Abdullah Saleh directly, but there are ways to work around that. 

Now, then: Hassan al-Haifi.   When I lived in Yemen, I used to make fun of him, both verbally and in print .  More than a bit purplish, I described him as ” important to read because he captures all of the flop-sweated conspiratorial nightmare gibberish of the old Arab nationalist myths in each of his columns, refusing to believe anything that doesn’t fit his original thesis.”  And to a large extent this is still true, though (a little older, now) I might describe it a little differently.  Rare is a column of his that doesn’t blame something- anything- on the Zionists. 

 So what makes him interesting?  Well, he is an ardent anti-Zionist, but also fiercely hates the stagnant Arab regimes and Islamic terrorism.   So he really doesn’t fit into any easy category.  It is fair to think that most people in the Arab world are more or less like him- no great fan of America, but no great fan of its enemies either.  Of course, the major actors in the Arab/Muslim world are not like this, but it is important to realize that the people America needs to win over don’t fall into simple categories.

 Al-Haifi’s column begins with a fascinating paragraph, which I will quote at length, which I think helps illustrate the complexities and contradictions that America faces in its efforts to win the fabled hearts and minds.

 IIt is becoming indeed that after almost eight years of sloppy governance in the United States, the American people are relying on their genuinely democratic institutions to come out of the abyss brought on by the incompetence and sheer arrogance of the Bush Administration (and the Zionist machine behind it). Yes the word “change” is having strong resonance in the pre-election primaries by which the leading American political parties are choosing their favored candidates for the office of the Presidency in the United States. It is imperative that we just do not recognize this as a significant development for the United States, but an important lesson by which to learn that unless the people have the final say in the adjudication of their leaders there is no sense in believing that indeed governance is meaningful otherwise. The significance of the current American political exercise is that the word “change” is the dominating influence in creating the choice of the electors. Even the candidates from the party of the incumbent President in the White House are unfailing in detecting the widespread desire for a change for the better, and they are quick to also adopt the platform of “change” to respond to this broad based desire. 
This- this is oddly inspiring, isn’t it?  Al-Haifi praises America and is almost awed at the idea of change, that despite what he sees as the nightmare of the last 8 years, the country can re-invent itself for the better.   This is the message America needs to promote, this message of constant improvement, if it wants to improve its image in the Middle East.   It isn’t enough to promote people like the brave Saad Ibrahim or Kanan Makiya- we need to support them, but true western-style democrats are in the minority.   US policy needs to be geared toward people who have a grudging, reluctant respect for the country, tempered by years of disilusionement both justified and not, but who have yet to turn completely away.  Anything else is just a pipe dream. 
 

(Apologies for the delay in posting- have been out of town)

A leader dies in a Muslim country, one in which chaos always seems a possible destiny, in a time of frail uncertainty, leaving the country in a new and vertiginous and dangerous world.   This is case in Pakistan, with the unsolved murder of Benazir Bhutto, but it is also the story in Yemen.

In Yemen it is the death of Sheik Abdullah bin-Hussein al-Ahmar, the speaker of Parliament, the founder an head of the Islah opposition party- which is Islamic but not Islamist- and the second most powerful man in Yemen.   Al-Ahmar was the leader of the Hashid tribal federation, Yemen’s largest and most powerful- the tribe to which President Ali Abdullah Saleh belongs.

This death is important for a number of reasons.  The most immediate and obvious of course is that in a country as fragile as Yemen any tear in the established order can send things out of control.    Yemen is lucky- something I am not sure I have ever said before- in that al-Ahmar’s death won’t lead to a sudden loss in power for the Hashid federation, thus lowering the chance for revolt.

To say that tribes play an important part in Yemeni politics is basically saying the the media plays a large role in US elections- that is, it is something that doesn’t need to be said.  And what al-Ahmar could do is unite and rally tribes under his flag.   Politics in Yemen involve the constant art of negotiation and alliance-building  between tribes and other groups (the north is far more tribal than the south).   In the ongoing revolt in Sa’ada Saleh has been constantly bargaining with the tribal leaders to aid him in his war.

Al-Ahmar was a genius in this.  The way tribal allegiances work one can see al-Ahmar, analogous to a ward boss in Daley’s Chicago or during Tammany Hall days.  He wasn’t delivering votes, per se, but backing.  And though Islah was an opposition party, on the highest levels it worked in tandem with Saleh.

Perhaps most importantly, al-Ahmar was the main go-between Yemen had with its most important relationship, that of Saudi Arabia.  We tend to think that every country’s most important relationship is with the US, but that is rarely the case.  Yemen has a difficult history with the rich giant to its north, with Saleh and the House of Saud enjoying mutual acrimony.   Al-Ahmar was the bridge between them.  Indeed, he died in a Riyadh hospital.

So he was many things to his country. We will see if his son is as well.    Saba is reporting that

The Son of the late parliament speaker, Hamid al-Ahmar has called on all Yemeni tribes to sign a one-year truce agreement during which they can put an end to revenge cases and tribal conflicts throughout the country, the independent al-Ghad newspaper reported on Wednesday. 

Whether or not the tribes listen to Hamid’s call- or whether they do anything beside fluff it off with the merest lip services, will go a long way to determining if anyone can even partly fill the shoes of the old man.   If the Hashid federation doesn’t retain even an element of stability, neither will Yemen.

Which brings us to perhaps the most crucial point- al-Ahmar was old and Saleh is getting up there himself.  Al-Ahmar has been grooming his son as Saleh is grooming his.   Ignoring the nepotism, the plain fact is that Yemen is beginning to see a shift in the two personalities that have dominated its public life for decades, and who are largely responsible for giving it whatever element of stability it has.

Yemen, in the next few years will face a raft of problems, from running out of water to seeing a huge population explosion.   Both of these will exacerbate Yemen’s problems with development, and in a worst-case though not-unlikely scenario even destroy their chances.   These multiple challenges, which would challenge even the most stable states, will also be a gigantic boon for al-Qaeda, which thrives in chaos.

And that is the problem: it is not only al-Qaeda which is undergoing a generational shift- the leadership of the country is as well.  The question is not only if the new leaders, be they the sons or anyone else, are capable of handling the challenges, it is whether or not they will even be allowed to.   Yemen has made attempts at democracy, and the public is irritated when the young Ahmad bin-Ali Abdullah Saleh is touted as the next President.  Whether by allegiance,raw power, or actual democratic transition, it will be very difficult for the next generation of leaders to consolidate legitimate and actual power.  And this instability and uncertainty is the last thing Yemen needs as it tries to face its myriad catastrophes growling behind the next bend.

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has released the first issue of The Sentinel, a scholarly look at terrorism around the world.   A pdf copy of it can be downloaded here.   Of particular interest is page 14, where Gregory Johnsen- late of this site- has a rigorous look at “Securing Yemen’s Co-operation in the Second Phase of the War on Al-Qaeda”.     This article looks at the changing nature of al-Qaeda in Yemen, looking at what some are calling a generational shift , and how Yemen has to deal with it.  The overall thrust of the publication is US policy, and how to combat and defeat terrorism.   Johnsen’s article is no exception, and is a good and sober guide at how to look at situational realities instead of having an overbearing blanket approach.

In an article later this week we’ll look more into the idea of a generational split in Yemen, and whether or not Yemen is becoming the new base for al-Qaeda, a notion that has been gaining some traction. 

Today’s Asharq Al-aswat has an interesting and disturbing article about al-Qaeda shifting its base to the Gulf, or, more precisely, Yemen.  It quotes an anonymous official saying he “believes that Yemen may replace Afghanistan as the incubator to breed, rally and train [terrorists]. In practice, Yemen could become the new Al Qaeda base- a label once reserved for Afghanistan.”  Most observers have tended to think the new base for The Base would be Pakistan, but it is good to remember the (possibly fake) hadith: “When disorder threatens, seek refuge in Yemen“.  

On a brighter note, the American University in Cairo has come out with its list of newly published books.   These range from ancient Egyptian history to a look at 19th-Century Egyptian Theatre to modern politics, with the latest in Arabic literature scattered in.  There also seems to be several books about the late Naguib Mafouz, including a series of conversations with him during his last hospital stay.  Worth checking out. 

Finally, the Boston Review has a long article by Abbas Milani about Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.   Milani explains how Ahmadinejad was shaped by the history of Iran in his lifetime- both its political and economic upheavals.  (with what is almost an aside about how the Shah’s modernization led to a massive influx into the cities- one of those little pieces of history that are massively important but often go unnoticed).   In doing so, he places Ahmadinejad squarely in the Iranian experience, and helps explains what he means for the country’s present and future.    On the subject, be sure to check out Ahmadinejad’s blog.   It isn’t as interesting as one would hope, though he does seem to be writing more, explaining “Since my last post on the blog, a few months have passed. But this doesn’t ‎mean that I have not been keeping my promise of spending fifteen minutes per week ‎on it”.    More instructive are the side-comments, with people either praising him or wishing that he would “die slowly”.