From CNN…

Iran’s president: No one likes Americans

BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) — Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, heading home after a two-day visit to Iraq, again touted his country’s closer relations with Iraq and reiterated his criticism of the United States.

“No one likes them,” Ahmadinejad told reporters prior to returning to Iran, referring to the predominantly U.S. makeup of coalition forces in Iraq.

This kind of rhetoric can only be balanced out by a strategic “I’m rubber; you’re glue” counter-offensive. 

No no no- not my solution, which I am keeping close to my vest until I get a lucrative government job (or until I get smart enough to come up with one- neither option seems close to the horizon). 

 This solution comes from Thomas Pickering, William Leurs, and Jim Walsh, and it is published in The New York Review of Books.   They think that now is the time to strike.

 The NIE and the improvement in US–Iranian relations over Iraq policy are part of it. Moreover, Iran’s upcoming parliamentary elections in mid-March seem likely to show a weakening of support for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his allies. This, in turn, will put intense pressure on him to raise his political status before the 2009 presidential elections. Without a noticeable improvement in the economy, Ahmadinejad can move in one of two directions. First, he can pick a fight with the United States, hoping that confrontation will boost his ratings. This has been his tendency until now, but it is a tactic that appears less effective each time it is used and has probably contributed to his declining popularity.

These strike me as true, and the lack of outcry or even sustained noise over Ahmadinejad’s trip to Iraq, even with his spouting the same boilerplate rhetoric, is a good sign.   And it seems both countries are recognizing, their own rivalries aside, that an unstable Iraq is in no one’s interest.

(Let’s not go nuts, though: the New York Times today is reporting that “For more than two hours, representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency were riveted by documents, sketches and even a video that appeared to have come from Iran’s own military laboratories. The inspector said they showed work ‘not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon,’ according to notes taken by diplomats.”  Obviously, this is a fluid and shifting relationship.)

Anyway, the article lays out a good, and I think important program (its workability is questionable, but that can be said with any plan).  The nut of it is that it is in our interests to convince Iran that working with the US on this is in theirinterests.  And they stress that choosing the second-best option (perhaps an Iranian nuclear program under strict multilateral control) is better than the worst option.  I believe this- not letting the perfect be the enemy of the good, and all that.  

Again, there is no perfect solution to this problem.  But we need to work on “less-bad” solutions, as morally and grammatically ugly as that sounds.    Until, of course, I reveal my perfect solution to this. 

Saturated as we are with news, it is easy to forget that Lebanon is still without a President, suffering under internal strife and external meddling over what the makeup of the next government should look like.  When this started in November it was scary.  It became frustrating as time went on, and now just seems absurd.   Unfortunately, however, absurdity is not the opposite of tragedy; more often that not it is merely a mask. 

 That seems to be the case in Lebanon.   The head of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, has left Beirut empty-handed, failing to bring a deal to the table.   All sides agree that Michel Suleiman should be the next President, but all are getting hung up on the make-up of the next cabinet.   The Party of God wants enough cabinet members to maintain veto power over major decisions, a decision that is supported by its main patron, Syria (and a decision undoubtedly supported by the patron of both Syria andHezbollah: Iran).   The other parties don’t want the Shi’ite group to have that kind of power, seeing it as little but a recidivist and violent proxy for Syrian domination and Iranian influence. 

This, of course, is Lebanon’s main problem: it is the constant testing ground for regional rivalries.   The next stop for this is the upcoming Arab Summit in Damascus, which has received boycott threats from the Saudis.  Sana Abdallah discusses this in a sharp Middle East Times article. 

 If there is a boycott, it will both cause and be caused by tension.  It is worth noting that serious boycotts have taken place during major events, such as the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  The threat of this shows how seriously Saudi Arabia is concerned with Iran, NIE notwithstanding.

(Of course, the seriousness of a boycott is somewhat leavened by the cold hard fact that nothing ever happens at Arab Summits.   It isn’t as if the Sauds will miss anything important or their absence will change anything, practically.  But that isn’t the point. Again: farce)

It is difficult to see a way out of this labyrinth.  To me, this is largely due to the intransigence of Hezbollah.  There has been talk for years about Hezbollah modifying themselves when they achieve political power, but that hasn’t been the case.  The problem with them is what they do without power- fall back into their old ways, threatening the Lebanese society (actually, this should be its own post, and hopefully will be tomorrow).  

But it isn’t just Hezbollah being difficult.   Read this Marc Sioris article from the Daily Star which quickly and insightfully demonstrates the political system’s internal rot.

In Lebanon, the only check on such families is the presence of other families competing for the same privileges. Take away that internal balance of power, and one of their scions might dominate the whole scene faster than one can say Bob Mugabe. Even those parties not built on inherited authority have adopted the same reverence for cults of personality and other tribal rituals, simultaneously making them greater threats to dilute the power of existing cliques but also diminishing the likelihood that they would bring substantive change.

Vali Nasr, one of the world’s leading experts on Shi’ism, and Ray Takeyh, author of the excellent Hidden Iran, have co-authored a piece in the latest Foreign Affairs about the dangers of Washington’s Iran containment strategy. 

 This is a grand strategy, which basically involves rallying all the Sunni Arab states against the growing Persian threat, and, in doing so, bringing stability to the region.  Nasr and Takeyh do not believe this to be a viable strategy, and think it will only further fissure the Levant.   Here is a long excerpt.

Containing Iran is not a novel idea, of course, but the benefits Washington expects from it are new. Since the inception of the Islamic Republic, successive Republican and Democratic administrations have devised various policies, doctrines, and schemes to temper the rash theocracy. For the Bush administration, however, containing Iran is the solution to the Middle East’s various problems. In its narrative, Sunni Arab states will rally to assist in the reconstruction of a viable government in Iraq for fear that state collapse in Baghdad would only consolidate Iran’s influence there. The specter of Shiite primacy in the region will persuade Saudi Arabia and Egypt to actively help declaw Hezbollah. And, the theory goes, now that Israel and its longtime Arab nemeses suddenly have a common interest in deflating Tehran’s power and stopping the ascendance of its protégé, Hamas, they will come to terms on an Israeli-Palestinian accord. This, in turn, will (rightly) shift the Middle East’s focus away from the corrosive Palestinian issue to the more pressing Persian menace. Far from worrying that the Middle East is now in flames, Bush administration officials seem to feel that in the midst of disorder and chaos lies an unprecedented opportunity for reshaping the region so that it is finally at ease with U.S. dominance and Israeli prowess.

But there is a problem: Washington’s containment strategy is unsound, it cannot be implemented effectively, and it will probably make matters worse. The ingredients needed for a successful containment effort simply do not exist. Under these circumstances, Washington’s insistence that Arab states array against Iran could further destabilize an already volatile region

The summation of the article is basically that rifts that exist within the Sunni Arab states are far too deep and old to be suddenly healed by a new threat, and that the US will make things far worse by establishing what is essentially a Cold War strategy.   The authors think that constructive dialogue with Iran, which is not as messianic or as expansionist as some believe, would be far more fruitful (they also do not downplay the serious problems and threats the US and region face regarding Iran). 

 Where the authors lose me a bit is comparing Iran to Russia or China- merely a country who wants to throw its weight around a little bit.   This is true, but it also masks the trouble in dealing with the theocracy.   Russia and China both have power essentially in one spot- the Party with China and the oligarchy that surrounds Putin, in Russia.   This makes them theoretically far more simple countries with which to deal.  You go right to the source.

 The problem is that in Iran there is no source- or, rather, there are many.  Iran, with its chaotic simulacrum of democracy, is inflicted with constantly-shifting alliances and multiple bases of power.  Yes, Khamaeni sits at the center, and the hard-core mullahs control the army and the judiciary, but Iranian government is not a monolith (interestingly, Takeyh’s book is one of the more useful reads on Iran’s hydra-headed system).  

This is not to say that their basic premise is wrong- it isn’t.  The containment theory, beside the reasons the authors listed, is flawed in that it is enabling other US enemies, much in the same way that the US is arming Sunni insurgents to fight al-Qaeda.  Governments who help us are all doing so in their own interest, which is not guaranteed to redound favorably upon us.   We would be creating the illusion of a combined Sunni front, but one fissuring and boiling with older rivalries. 

But Nasr and Takeyh underestimate the difficulty of letting Iran see it is in their best interest to work with the system.  They are ultimately correct that it is possible, but readers of the article need to be aware that it is far from a magic bullet solution.

The revolution which swept away a dynasty and altered political Islam for the rest of our lives turned 29 today, marked by celebrations in the Iranian capital of Tehran.

(Ahmadinejad speaks in front of a giant mural. ABACA via Middle East Times)

During the celebrations, Ahmadinejad struck what will inevitably be called “a defiant note.”

Addressing thousands of his supporters in Tehran, Ahmadinejad considered the nuclear crisis with the West as “closed” and that the “enemies of the Iranian Revolution can only play with pieces of paper, nothing more.”

He warned the Western world against issuing a third set of U.N. sanctions on his country because the “Iranian people will not back down an inch over their right to nuclear energy…. They should not make another mistake by voting a new resolution against Iran.”

This is the kind of statement that can be parsed over and over, Sovietology-style, with endless interpretations of intent, but I think it can also be dismissed as nothing out of the ordinary, and, indeed, very predictable for a national/nationalist ceremony in a tired and wary country.   Ahmadinejad was pumping up the base, if you will. 

It strikes me, on a personal note, that the revolution is just slightly younger than I am, having just turned 29 myself.   As much as a precocious genius as I was, according to my mom, I obviously don’t have any recollection of a world before the mullahs.   As the Cold War ended, and eventually fears of and wars with radical Islam became part of daily life, it was easy to forget how much those grainy videos of packed and sweaty streets, mobbing a man seemingly straight out of an ancient, austere desert, changed the world.

The battle against the Soviets in Afghanistan was hugely important.   But the Iranian revolution, even though it was a Shi’ite movement, showed young radicals that the world didn’t have to be a binary America-or-Soviet place, that their fervor and drive could allow them to create a state they wanted, to overthrow what they saw as corrupt and degenerate regimes.

 Clearly, no two revolutions are alike, and the “success” of Iran hasn’t been replicated in any Sunni state (The Taliban took power in a very uniqu circumstance).   So we tend to discount the impact that Iran had, partly because it has been with us for so long.   But it is an interesting quirk of history, that Iran, the first eruption of political Islam, has carried itself through the Wahabbi irruption, and continues to be the single most important country in the Middle East.

On that note, I will print perhaps the finest picture of all time.

 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visits Iran’s new space center. (Photo: Agence France Presse–Getty Images

Be sure to check out this article by Claude Salhani in the Middle East Times.   Relevant to Bush’s Middle East trip, a large part of which was dedicated to shoring Gulf states’ support for solidarity against Iran, it is titled “What Does Iran Want?”

That’s a damn good question, and Salhani addresses it in his short article.   He toys with the idea of Shi’ite unity and of the tactical defense having a nuclear weapon would provide.   But it is at the end of his article that he comes up with a thesis not mentioned nearly often enough. 

The Iranian Revolution is fed by perpetual upheaval. Like any revolution, if it stops, it dies. This may partially explain the regime’s involvement in fomenting unrest so that it can sustain itself. The greatest danger to the Islamic Revolution are not threats of a military invasion by the United States. Quite the contrary. These threats only strengthen the regime by awakening nationalist feelings. Indeed, the biggest danger to the Iranian regime would be for the United States to normalize relations with Iran.

That is an excellent point.  Most regimes, however lofty their goals may be when taking the throne, devolve into a desperate battle to retain power.  Not all revolutions are the same, but most fizzle into similar entropic states.    Keeping up tension is the only way to even partially sustain the energy needed to keep perpetual motion.    There are surely many factors to Iran wanting to be a major player in the Gulf, and for its support for Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria et al, but when planning policy toward Iran it is important to remember that one of its motivations is merely the continuation of power.   It is vital not to play into that. 

An editorial in today’s Middle East Times nails it:

And if indeed the president’s concern is the Arab-Israeli dispute, then why the stops in four Gulf countries? Why the visits to Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia? It is interesting to note that those four countries share the same concerns over Iran’s rising influence in the region.

…Bush’s visit to the region — the Gulf region, that is — might well have more to do with Iran than with the question of Palestine.

Iran has become the single-biggest issue for policy-makers in the region- possibly even more than Iraq.  Bush would love an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal to his legacy, but the real interest is Iran.    The maneuvering between the Gulf States- along with the broader Arab world- and Iran changes on a day-to-day basis.  My guess is Bush wants to shore up support and make some kind of cohesive policy.   He must not like the new willingness to at least partially co-operate with the Iranian government. 

This is especially true in light of the confrontation between the US Navy and the speedboats of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp.  According to the US Navy “as the Iranian boats neared the American vessels, a radio threat was issued that the American ships would explode. The verbal warnings broadcast over the internationally recognized bridge-to-bridge radio channel said, “I am coming at you, and you will explode in a few minutes.”

 The Iranian government has denied this.

“What happened between the Guards and foreign vessels was an ordinary identification,” Ali Reza Tangsiri, commander of the Guards naval forces in the region, told the Mehr news agency.

“No special engagement took place between the Guards and the foreign side,” he said, adding that the Guards naval forces had a right to control and identify “any vessel entering Persian Gulf waters” to the northwest.  (AFP)

Tensions are rising in anticipation of Bush’s visit.  Iran is now, and will remain for at least the rest of his term, at the front of the President’s mind.

Interested in knowing why Lebanon frequently has the difficulties it does?  Pay attention to the last sentence excerpted here.

From The Daily Star

Iranian official to meet Assad to discuss Lebanon


Saturday, January 05, 2008

ROME: Ali Larijani, member of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council and adviser to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, will visit Damascus on Saturday to discuss with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad the situation in Lebanon, according to a report published by the Italian news Agency AKI on Friday. “The visit also aims to formulate coordinating stances between Syria and Teheran in this regard,” AKI said. Larijani is also set to meet with Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem and some Palestinian officials. “He may also meet with some Lebanese officials who might travel to Damascus for this purpose,” the agency added. - Agencies

If one is rooting for Lebanon to get past the scars and divisions of its past- a difficult goal under any circumstances- one could note with bitter cynicism the decency, the sheer graciousness that Larijani might meet with some representatives of the country about which he is co-ordinating policy. 

 But Syria isn’t dealing only with Iran.  The Arab League is meeting on Sunday, and Lebanon will be at the top of the agenda, according to the Daily Star.   It will be interesting to see what their statement- which, anyway, carries little wieght- will be.  On the one hand the Arab League is generally reluctant to criticize another Arab state, but despite some thawing the Arab states are still leery of Iran, so might be in a bind on how to treat Syria.  A decent hint though comes from Arab league Secretary Amr Moussa, who “told Al-Arabiyya television Thursday that solving Lebanon’s problem was a Lebanese, an Arab, a regional and an international responsibility. ‘While we acknowledge there are conflicting interests and foreign [involvement], Lebanese politicians bear the responsibility first [for their country] before Arab, regional and international politicians.’”

 This of course is taking a large burden off of Syria and punting the issue down the road, which does nothing to help Lebanon.   The country is basing itself for a large march by the opposition, led by Hassan Nasrallah’s Hezbollah.  Tony Bey at Beirut2Bayside discusses it thusly:

It’s very clear that this is the Syrian order of operations, as it was the Syrian regime’s orphaned pitbulls — Naser Qandil, Wi’am Wahhab, Suleiman Frangieh and the mukhabarat rag al-Diyar — who were enthusiastically announcing the marching orders.

It was interesting to hear that clown Qandil (who will likely end up in jail for his role in the Hariri assassination) try to base this on Nasrallah’s latest imbecilic and pitiful interview. This point was accurately noted in the NOW editorial:

Is it us, or did you also sense that Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, in his interview on Wednesday night, was walking a fine line between Syrian priorities and Iran’s apparent desire to avoid a breakdown in Lebanon? If we are right, Nasrallah’s threat to take to the streets is a sop to Syria…

In other words, the order is Syrian par excellence. But Qandil laying this at Nasrallah’s feet, aside from showing just how much they need his cover to have any weight at all in the country, shows just how much Syria is pressuring Nasrallah to blow up the place. His lame balancing act in his interview was a reflection of this.

Bey, as always, uses delightfully strident language, but the point is there: Syria and Iran most likely want different things with Lebanon, as do the other Arab countries (as does the US and EU).   It seems that Lebanon is no closer to ending its run as political testing ground than the heady days after Hariri was killed. 

Marc Lynch has an article in the Christian Science Monitor on US policy toward Iran vis a vis the Gulf States.   The thesis is essentially that the Gulf States have shifted their policy toward Iran to one of pragmatic accomadation (though not friendship).

Lynch writes:

The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are accommodating themselves to Iran’s growing weight in the region’s politics. They remain key parts of America’s security architecture in the region, hosting massive US military bases and underwriting the American economy in exchange for protection. But as Saudi analyst Khalid al-Dakheel argues, they are no longer content sitting passively beneath the US security umbrella and want to avoid being a pawn in the US-Iranian struggle for power. Flush with cash, they are not interested in a war that would mess up business.

I find this idea very hard to disagree with.  Even though it seems just like yesterday that the Sauds and others were lining up to fight the “Shi’ite Crescent”, and are still weary of Iran, they are consumate pragmatists, and never need a weathervane to know which way the wind blows. 

This point is hammered home by Christian Koch of the Gulf Research Center (.pdf file), who writes that Iran no longer threatens the GCC’s sense of purpose.

 These two articles are I think surely correct, but, just as it turned out to be wrong in the long run to talk about the anti-Iran axis as a permanent feature, we shouldn’t go talking about this development as anything other than a trend, something that could change at any moment. 

The Gulf Research Center has published a series of articles Nuclearization of the Gulf, which can be downloaded for free as a .pdf file from their main page, or you can order a hard copy if you want something impressive on your bookshelf.    Interesting and comprehensive site in and of itself, and the paper looks very interesting.  The contents are…
- Nuclear Development in the Gulf: A Strategic or Economic Necessity

- Official Documents on the GWMD Free Zone