Opposition groups to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary regime called for massive protests and unrest on February 11, 2010, the anniversary of the overthrow of the government of the Shah in 1979. The messages were disseminated via the web, on blogs and opposition group websites. The celebrations will conclude with a big political gathering in Azadi Square, where the opposition wants to stage the most massive protests.

In the past, the Iranian government has fought such calls for protest by implementing corrupting software into its own websites that would cause opposition websites to crash. The Iranian government is still heavily censoring opposition websites today. The only way to read such websites is through a proxy server. According to the popular opposition website, Balatrin.com the Iranian government attempted to crash Balatrin.com through pagerreboot, which sent hundreds of messages to Balatrin when a user would visit the official government website Fars News.

The Iranian government has promised a tough response to any unrest. The last protests, on December 27^th, concluded in unprecedented blood shed and violence. In addition, five protestors were put on trial, charged with the crime “Moharebeh”, which is punishable by death.

On Saturday January 16, 2010 the Security Council and Germany met to discuss economic sanctions on Iran.  As of Saturday, the deadline to accept Russia’s proposal to enrich Iran’s Uranium in Russia had expired without an answer from Iran. In addition, the 2010 anti-proliferation conference is approaching and the U.S. would like sanctions in place before the conference. All of the countries sitting on the Security Council besides China had sent a high level diplomat to the discussion. China, however, sent a low level attaché to the meeting, signaling her dissatisfaction with the discussions. Sanctions without full international support, implemented by the U.S. and some European countries, are currently in place and have not been enough to stop Iran from desisting from its nuclear ambitions. The U.S.’s goal is to involve the entire international community, including Russia and China, the two countries who have the most influence on Iran because of their significant economic ties with Iran.

Not surprisingly, China attempted to block all efforts by the other powers to come to an agreement regarding Iran. China requested that the Security Council engage in more diplomatic talks with the Iranians before implementing any sanctions. To that end the Council scheduled a telephone conference to discuss the issue further.

China’s opposition to economic sanctions against Iran is three- fold. Firstly, China is a frequent human rights violator and consequently does not like to interfere in other sovereign’s national agenda. Secondly China has begun to have extensive economic involvement with Iran. Currently, China imports 15% of her oil from Iran. Considering that China has oil reserves of 25 days, it is very important to her that the oil flow is not interrupted by sanctions. China’s national oil company Sinopec has signed a 2 billion dollar deal to develop Iran’s Azadegan oil field. In addition, China has signed a 3.2 Billion dollar deal with Iran to import natural gas. Most importantly, China sells a significant amount of gasoline to Iran because Iran does not have oil refineries within its borders. Gasoline is Iran’s Achilles’ heel, if her gasoline flow was cut off, she would likely buckle under the Security Council’s demands and stop nuclear testing. The Obama administration has tried to push for a gasoline embargo, but European oil companies have lobbied their governments against such a move and China, whose oil companies are subsidiaries of the Chinese government has opposed the embargo as well. Finally, China has recently begun to establish an influence in the Middle East, aiming to diminish the U.S.’s standing in the region. China has formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where Iran has observer status. In effect, the Chinese have linked their interests to those of Iran should it become the regional hegemon.

The sanctions favored by the U.S. State Department, would mainly target the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and their exporting and shipping businesses. The sanctions would also prevent any humanitarian or development loans from the World Bank and others. Some security services and politicians have indicated that the window of opportunity for sanctions is fast closing. They fear that Iran will soon test its first nuclear weapon, at which point, sanctions will have no effect on her.

Notwithstanding China’s recent behavior, there is still hope that the Chinese will join the other powers in sanctioning Iran because of their long-term interests. The Chinese do not favor nuclear proliferation and instability in regions where they have an economic or political interest. Since China must import all of its oil from abroad she cannot afford a nuclear Middle East in the long term. Should Iran attain nuclear weapons, regional tensions will rise between Iran and a number of countries. China imports a great deal of oil from Saudi-Arabia as well as from Iran: instability in both countries would put China in a precarious position. Hopefully, China’s long term interest in a stable Middle East will take precedence over short-term gain.

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem points out several obvious but oft-overlooked truths in an interview with Foreign Policy. Firstly, he notes that keeping Syria on a state-sponsors of terror list while asking the Assad regime to assist in combating terrorism in Palestine. His point, most likely, was that Syria is too important for the United States to be sanctioned and isolated the way it has been in the recent past. Decontextualized from Syrian interests, it seems clear that the term “terrorist” has been thrown around by the US government enough to make it entirely devoid of meaning. It’s unfortunate, because it obscures our understanding of Middle Eastern politics.

Second, he points out that part of the US strategy in the region in the past, (as outlined in this op-ed by Max Boot, and which may change as more diplomatic channels open up between Washington and Tehran, Washington and Damascus, et cetera) has been to bring Arab nations and Israel together against Iran. If the objective is long term peace, then this is … a weak approach. He’s certainly not the first to point this out. Gulf states, who host many Iranian expatriates and are only a short swim away from Iran, and generally militarily weaker, have been much more pragmatic in their approach to Iranian relations than has the United States. (Hillary Mann Leverett and Stephen Leverett adopted this position in the NYT only a couple of weeks ago).

Am I the only one who did not know that Barbie’s birthday and International Women’s Day were both on March 8th? It’s so absurd it could only be true.

In honor, the Times has a lovely piece on Barbie in Iran. And, dated but still interesting, Katherine Zoepf’s coverage of the doll pictured below, Fulla.

Fulla, Barbie's Middle Eastern competitor.

The United States and the UAE now have an agreement wherein the UAE can utilize nuclear power reactors as a civilian energy source, but will import and export nuclear material and waste. Hmm. This means that the UAE is the first Arab state to develop nuclear capabilities. The NY editorial board points out the obvious: it can't be coincidence that they are launching this campaign, coupled with very slick lobbying efforts in Washington, coterminously with Iran's nuclear project. (Although the editorial does seem to waffle between a realist stance on geopolitics and modernity cheerleading). The Gulf States are, in fact, considering a joint civilian nuclear energy effort that would include Iran. It looks like Hillary Clinton will support efforts of this nature as Secretary of State; we’ll see.

… and its potential to change the world at Goodreads.com (if you join, then we can be friends and you can see all the books I am reading). Dr.Nafisi is the author of Reading Lolita in Tehran and now her memoir, Things I’ve Been Silent About.  

Martin Indyk, of the Brookings Institute and numerous other institutions of repute, and the equally credentialed Gary Samore of the Council on Foreign Relations co-directed a research initiative called Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President. You can read summaries of their work from Brookings here and from CFR here, or purchase it from Brookings here. From what my cursory reading of the summaries tells me, they focused on the big-ticket items: reconciliation and rebuilding in Iraq, defrosting diplomatic relations and stifling nuclear ambitions in Iran, resolving the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, and combating Islamic terrorism. Numerous scholars from both institutes (and possibly outside) contributed, so I am not sure whether they advanced a philosophical strategy for the region or simply stuck to policy recommendations for the individual challenges. I’m wondering whether it would be better NOT to advance a broad doctrine with respect to the Middle East … should each of these issues be treated individually? My thought is no, they are all related and need to be understood as such. School responsibilities are between me and perusing the reports, but my thoughts will be up here when I do.

This is the first time and Iranian president has congratulated an American president-elect since at least the 1979 revolution. Mr. Ahmadinejad of course mentioned his wish list, including de-militarized U.S. foreign policy and justice for Palestine.

The Brookings Institution's Middle East Youth Initiative is following the developments of the global economic whatever-we-are-calling it in a series called Food, Fuel and Finance: How Will the Middle East Weather the Global Economic Crisis? Slipping Oil Prices: is the Oil-Rich Middle East Prepared?, the first installment, offers a brief history of oil revenues over the last 20 years in the Persian Gulf. It's conveniently arranged in Q and A format, which helps if you are someone who (like me) feels a strong temptation to let their eyes glaze over when they start to see a series of words like “revenue” and “inelastic demand” one after another. Politics, however, always capture my attention, and I want to draw attention to one crucial point that the report makes in this arena:

For these countries, bringing their economies to a soft landing may prove much easier than managing the downsizing of expectations without a political backlash. Leaders in the region have offered scant warning to their citizens regarding the end of the petro-boom. Even after the global financial crisis had begun, mega projects were being announced in the GCC as if to defy the reality of what the global downturn will do the region's economies.

The Gulf countries’ generous spending has kept citizens relatively happy - textbook rentierism - and as spending is curtailed because of falling oil prices, there will be a backlash in public sentiment.

The one bright spot in all of this is that hard times make the case for policy reform more persuasive. The oil rich countries have a list of policy options before them, including reorienting education away from mere seeking of formal degrees toward acquisition of skills, transforming the search for government jobs into a search for careers in the public or private sector, and giving the youth a greater voice in shaping their own destiny.With the oil feast all but over, the time has come to set the incentives for the region's youth to become tomorrow's productive middle class.

This may be true. The relative weakness of the Gulf states’ militaries make total-police-state-mode to stifl uprisings unlikely. (Although this weekend's piece in the New York Times magazines drew some clear lines between the Emirates and Iran, and this wouldn't be first time the United States stepped in to contain a popular uprising against a government they consider convenient). It's naive, though, to think that threatened and weakened Gulf governments’ first responses will be to open up their political systems on their own. Egypt's Hosni Mubarak doesn't seem to have any trouble maintaining a corrupt and undemocratic regime on a shoestring budget. Bashar al Assad is still around. Ali Abdullah Saleh might control only a small corner of his country, but he's still president. Seeing political reform as an inevitable consequence of economic failure sounds to me like a “birth pangs of the new Middle East” argument. (To be clear, I don't think that's precisely what Salehi-Isfahani is arguing here). He's right that the case is more persuasive when the governments can no longer purchase their citizens’ loyalty. And the Gulf countries may arrive at that conclusion on their own. Then again, some may not. I would approach any framing of a global economic meltdown as an “opportunity” skeptically.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seeks to correct some misconceptions about his feelings on Jews and Israelis:

"We are opposed to the idea that the people who live there [Israel] should be thrown into the sea or be burnt," he said.

Well.

He maintains an opposition to the Zionist regime, and believes a new government should be chosen by referendum. His statement was intended to draw a distinction between the people of Israel and their government.