Middle East

And no, the title isn’t some kind of National Review fantasy about the links between public broadcasting and Evildoers, but rather about a segment on NPR this morning regarding the State Department’s annual report on terrorism.  

The guest was Ambassador Dell Dailey, who talked at length about foreign fighters in Iraq returning home.  We’ve discussed this on the blog regarding Yemen (of course) and to some extent Algeria.   Dailey focused mostly on Algeria, and how the GPSC has become Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb.  Returning jihadis from Iraq are proving themselves to be even more dangerous and adaptable than their predecessors. 

One thing that Dailey focused on was the Sinjar Records- al-Qaeda paperwork on foreign fighters that was found in Iraq.  Read through this summary if you have some time.  It is fascinating and bizarre- one thing which is rarely talked about is how clericalal-Qaeda is.    The documents show where the fighters are from, contact numbers, items entrusted (”500 riyal and a watch”), etc.   It is jarring and a wierd mix of comedy and horror.  Bureaucracy and suicide bombings mixing. 

 Anyway- I will try to read at least the Middle East section of the State Department report tonight, and will report back on it ASAP.*

*- With more emphasis on the “as possible” than the “soon”. 

Two attacks in Yemen today, onenear the US Embassy in Sana’a and another in the southern province of Abyan.  As of right now, the Yemeni government doesn’t see this as targeting the US Embassy, but rather as a “purely criminal incident”.    To be sure, the mortars in Sana’a hit a school, some 500 meters from the Embassy.    So well it could easily have been an attack on American interests, it could also have been a local matter.

Now, in the last Yemen post here, the jihadi journal “Echo of Battles” was discussed, and it was noted that the last issue directly presaged an attack.   So that does lend some credence that this could have been an al-Qaeda operation, designed to co-incide with the publication of the newest issue.  Possibly one could say smart money is on that, but I think it is short-sighted to think jihadism is the only problem or the sole source of violence in Yemen.  

The attack in the south is a little different.  It does carry the scent of Islamic militancy, but it is unsure whether it is al-Qaeda, the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, or possible any other splinter group.  While many- most, even- Islamic militant groups share the same broad aims and are driven by similar motivations, it is wrong to think of them as monolithic.   It might be comforting to do so, and possibly fit a pre-conceived political viewpoint, but it does nothing to help the problem.  There has no been a single movement in the history of the world that wasn’t beset from conception with dissidents, schismatics, heretics.   To imagine al-Qaeda, and Islamic militancy more broadly, to be any different is simply counter-productive.

Several Yemeni papers have reported that at-large al-Qaeda leader Qasim al-Raymi has been spotted at a funeral in Sana’a.   Al-Raymi, according to al-Needa, was spotted by an eyewitness in Sana’a beautiful, tangled Old City.   This report is seconded by al-Sahwa (which also has a picture of al-Raymi). 

(Thanks to Greg for his translation skills)

Al-Raymi has been moving up the ranks of al-Qaeda in Yemen since the jailbreak of 2005.   In this, perhaps the most seminal moment of Yemen’s struggle with jihadism, 23 suspected terrorists literally tunneled their way out of prison.   The prison experience, combined with the influx of veteran jihadis returning from Iraq, has shaped what some (including this author) are calling the second generation of al-Qaeda in Yemen.

Here, from al-Arabiyya, is a powerful graphic depicting what the prison break almost assuredly looked like.

For a bit more on al-Raymi, here is from Greg’s description of the escapees.

Qasim Yahya Mahdi al-Raymi (b. 1977): Al-Raymi is from Sanaa, and was also known by the kunya Abu Hurayrah al-San’ani. His younger brother, Faris, who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, was killed in mysterious circumstances in Sanaa in June 2007 after leaving his house in the company of Zakariya al-Yafa’i, another escapee. Another brother, Ali, is listed as being in U.S. custody at Guantanamo Bay. Al-Raymi was arrested in connection with a series of explosions in the al-Qadasayah district of Sanaa in 2002. He was charged with being part of the cell that was planning to attack five embassies in Sanaa. During his trial in 2004, al-Raymi threatened to cut off the leg of Said al-Akil, the public prosecutor. Al-Akil’s house was subsequently attacked with a hand grenade later that week. Al-Raymi was sentenced to five years in prison on August 30, 2004, which was later upheld by a superior court in February 2005.

Al-Raymi appearing like this is somewhat amazing.   It is an incredibly bold move, showing his face in the capital- while Yemeni Political Security isn’t the most efficient of its kind in the world, it is far from incompetent.   Al-Raymi was sending some kind of message.  What that message is constitutes the pressing question.

A clue could be in the second issue of an on-line jihadi mag (link not working- will try to fix later), called “Echoes of Battle”.    In it, the Yemeni organization seems to have changed its name from “Al-Qaeda Organization of Jihad in Yemen” to “Al-Qaeda Organization of Jihad in the Southern Arabia Penninsula.”   This is somewhat bolder, both more atavistic and future-looking (similar to many of al-Qaeda’s goals).   It would appear that as the al-Raymi and his contemporaries wage their internecine battle against the older generation, they are also expanding their goals and their reach.   Much like al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, they no longer present themselves as merely a national movement.   It is also worth noting that the first issue of “Echoes of Battles” directly presaged an attack on foriegn tourists.  We’ll see if this is their calling card, or if that was just a coincidence.

(apologies for the narcissistic links today)

This seems in contradiction to my post below, which states that it is impossible for Hamas or Hezbollah to modify themselves into responsible political actors.   So before I get into this post I’ll clarify- it isn’t impossible, at all, for people to reform, no matter how murderous or nihilistic or jihad-drenched they were; it is impossible for certain organizations to reform, because once their reason for being dies up, the do as well. 

OK, on to this!  A Financial Times editorial by former Bush Deputy Assistant Peter Wehner argues that “in large measure because of what is unfolding in Iraq, the tide within the Islamic world is beginning to run strongly against al-Qaeda – and this, in turn, may be the single most important ideological development in recent years.”   This seems to jive with the New York Times article discussed directly below, about how the cleric-fueled carnage in Iraq is turning youngsters away from faith.  But this blood-weary turning from religion by the people closest to its most violent extremes is not the same as a general discrediting of al-Qaeda, or militant Islam in general.

Wehner goes on to list some influential clerics, formerly some of jihad’s great supporters, who have started to publish and speak about its ills.   Again, Wehner:

In November 2007 Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (“Dr Fadl”) published his book, Rationalizations on Jihad in Egypt and the World, in serialised form. Mr Sharif, who is Egyptian, argues that the use of violence to overthrow Islamic governments is religiously unlawful and practically harmful. He also recommends the formation of a special Islamic court to try Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s number two and its ideological leader, and calls the attacks on September 11 2001 a “catastrophe for all Muslims”.

Mr Sharif’s words are significant because he was once a mentor to Mr Zawahiri. Mr Sharif, who wrote the book in a Cairo prison, is “a living legend within the global jihadist movement”, according to Jarret Brachman, a terrorism expert.

Another important event occurred in October 2007, when Sheikh Abd Al-‘Aziz bin Abdallah Aal Al-Sheikh, the highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia, issued a fatwa prohibiting Saudi youth from engaging in jihad abroad. It states: “I urge my brothers the ulama [the top class of Muslim clergy] to clarify the truth to the public . . . to warn [youth] of the consequences of being drawn to arbitrary opinions and [religious] zeal that is not based on religious knowledge.” The target of the fatwa is obvious: Mr bin Laden.

I tend to think that among the most militant of the Islamists a man infused in the Saudi power structure wouldn’t have much sway.   The House of Saud is one of bin Laden’s main demons, and it is easy in his movement to discredit anyone associated with it.  

 But al-Sharif is a different story.   He is the former Emir of the Egyptian group al-Jihad, and was a mentor to Ayman al-Zawahiri.   A legend in the jihadi community.  A new articleby Omar Ashour in the latest Perspectives on Terrorism gets into his role, who he was and what he is doing now. 

I’ll be brief, here, and let Ashour be long.   Al-Sharif is trying to convince young militants that the path of violent jihad is wrong.  Not just with morality, but with theology.  Who is he trying to convince?   Three different layers of militants.

The first layer is composed of a small core group that surrounds Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri and receives direct orders from them. This layer is the least likely to be affected. Al-Zawahiri has already criticized al-Sharif and mocked the idea of revisions, publications and “fax machines” in Egyptian prisons. In his latest audio statement, he promises to release a counterargument to al-Sharif’s Document – a pledge that shows that al-Qaeda takes the new literature seriously enough to bother issuing a counterargument. In addition, Bin Laden criticized the behavior of al-Qa‘ida in Iraq after the media announced that al-Sharif was in the process of writing the Document, but before the Document’s release. Bin Laden may have attempted to minimize the effects of the Document and send a preemptive message to his sympathizers that there would be changes in al-Qaeda’s violent behavior and terrorist tactics.

The second layer is al-Qai‘da’s self-styled “branches” in Algeria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and even Egypt. Of these, the Egyptian branch is most likely to be affected because of the weight of al-Sharif in Egypt, as well as the revisions of the IG. In the words of one of the IG’s “de-radicalized” historical leaders, al-Sharif’s Document is the final say in the “Islamic jurisprudence of violence” in Egypt. [14]

The third layer is that of the ‘Internet militants’. This group is mostly teenagers and young men inspired by al-Qaeda’s rhetoric, but have no organizational ties or contacts with its network. In other words, this is a layer of ‘self-recruited members’. Probably aware that this layer has the weakest ties with the core of al-Qaeda, al-Sharif dedicated a large part of his Document to warning young Muslim men about the ‘Internet Sheikhs.’ This layer is likely the one that will be affected the most, and its members could be discouraged from following Salafi-Jihadism in general and al-Qa‘ida in particular because of the influence of al-Sharif’s Document.

Now, we’ve seen this movie before, in Yemen.  Hamoud al-Hitar, a Yemeni cleric, ran an operation trying to persuade young militants that their jihad was un-Islamic, talking in prisons to those who weren’t charged with violent crimes.  If they could convince him they had reformed, they were free to go (though presumably with an eye on them).  For a good look at his movement, read this Worldview article by Gregory Johnsen.

The program, which was touted in the West, isn’t working as well as it once looked.  Recidivism rates are pretty high, and the program has been kind of pushed under the rug a bit. 

But I think what is happening in Egypt is different.  Al-Hitar, though a distinguished scholar, didn’t have much sway with the militant Salafi community.  He was able, with his eloquence, intellect, and knowledge of the Quran, to persuade young militants that their path was wrong.   But some of them might have just pretended to believe, and other might have believed then but fell back into old patterns the next time a charismatic cleric talked to them. 

Al-Sharif, the Egyptian, is different.  He might be labeled an apostate, but his words carry more weight, especially in the Maghreb.   He is respected and admired.   The analysis of the article- the hope, maybe- is that such a man could change the tenor of the debate, so it isn’t only Americans and secular despots and quislings telling the Islamists to cool it.  

But prison conversions aren’t always accepted by those on the outside.   And, perhaps more important, al-Qaeda itself has spread out and become a less top-down organization, and has lowered its standards.   One doesn’t exactly need to be an expert, or even someone mildly interested in, theology.   Just have some kind of anger and want to kill.  These kind of disputes can easily go over the head of a bored young man. 

That said, al-Qaeda can’t last forever.  No revolutionary group ever does, no matter how eternal they project themselves.  Things fall apart.  I don’t know how much of an impact top clerics decrying jihad will have in the short term, but if it changes the tenor of discussion in the long-term, than Islamism in any form will be weakened. 

An Oliver Guitta article in the Middle East Times from yesterday analyzes the ascent of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, particularly Algeria (Here is an earlier post about the Dec 11th Algiers bombings).   Basically, the thrust of the article is that al-Qaeda is consolidating its influence in the region, and that “One of its primary goals is to federate the main terror organizations in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya in order to attain full regional reach.”   I personally doubt that this will ever really be the case, as one of the toughest things to do in the world is to get a bunch of disjointed revolutionaries to fall under one flag, even if it is that of bin Laden.  I’ll get into that more in a later post.

 But one of the more interesting passages in the article is this, which I will quote at some length.

And the Dec. 11 spectacular double suicide bombings in Algiers against the United Nations and Algeria’s constitutional court are the latest proof of AQIM’s potential to create chaos in North Africa.

The symbolical aspect of these attacks is very important. First, Dec. 11, 1960 is a crucial date in Algeria’s history of independence from France. The constitutional court happens to be located on the December 11 Boulevard.

And most importantly the “11th” factor is one of al-Qaida’s hallmarks: not only for 9/11 in the United States, but also for 3/11 in Madrid and AQIM’s suicide attacks on 3/11 in Casablanca, 4/11 in Algiers, 7/11 in Lakhdaria in Algeria and now 12/11.

AQIM has succeeded in creating an “11″ psychosis; some in Algeria even describe the 11th as “the date of the devil.”

Now, this is interesting.  When the 3/11 Madrid attacks hit, there was a lot of conspiratorial kerfluffle and internet numerological time-wastery, and it was easily dismissed.   That stuff is fun to an extent, but meaningless (Oh! Here’s one! Allende was overthrown in Chile on 9/11 in 1973- that is the date of CIA underground ops, obviously).  People are conditioned to look for patterns, as they provide a level of comfort in times of chaos.  Even if we don’t like the order, the idea that human events are controlled by grand plans is a strangely reassuring one. 

But all the “11’s” in ALgeria might actually conform to something.  I would imagine it was a coincidence at first, but terrorists are often not dummies.  When there are random explosions, people are scared but it isn’t always at the forefront of the mind.  But if there is a specific day every month, the lead-up can become unbearable.   And that, after all, is one of terrorism’s main goals.

Secondarily, forcing a pattern onto the chaos can help if the goal of AQIM is really to consolidate power in the Maghreb.   It makes them seem more powerful and competent.   It can help bring splinter groups under their umbrella.

 Again, though, this is just light Christmas speculation. 

For the first time since the revolution of 1979, a sitting Iranian President has been invited to participate in the hajj.  King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia has extended an invitation to the head of his regional rival, a gesture one could think is the triumph of religion over politics, but, in reality, is just the opposite.

Saudi Arabia has long worried about Iran’s Shi’ite revolution,  especially in light of an oil-rich Iran taking advantage of a weakened America to spread its regional influence.   So worried, in fact, that the House of Saud agreed to fund Sunni militants in Lebanon and Palestine to fight against their Iran-backed Shi’ite rivals.   This was chronicled by Seymour Hersh in a March New Yorker article.

But, it seems the National Intelligence Estimate has changed everything, or at least the perception of everything.   The ides that Iran is no longer actively engaged in the pursuit of nuclear weapons has given some breathing room to monarchs worried about regional confrontation.   It is hard to imagine Abdallah extending this invitation without the estimate.   This is not to say that the Gulf Arab states are no longer terrified of Iran.  Max Boot, just returning from a trip to the Gulf Region, reports that “some of those most worried about the mullahs wear flowing headdresses, not yarmulkes, and they have good cause for concern, notwithstanding the sanguine tilt many news accounts put on the NIE.”

So, then: what?  If Saudi Arabia is still scared of Iran, and whose oil dollars are still the biggest obstacle to Iran’s plans for regional dominance, why are they breaking bread together?  Because Middle Eastern politics are not as straightforward as one would like: enemies can work together for another goal.  The Middle Eastern Times reported that “Lebanese analysts expect that Ahmadinejad’s Hajj pilgrimage this month will help the anti- and pro-Western politicians in Lebanon to come closer to electing a president and to formulate an agenda and lineup for a new cabinet”.  This confused me.  Saudi Arabia is still the biggest regional financial backer of  Saad Hariri’s Future Party, and Iran is the sponsor of his two biggest foes, Syria and Hezbollah.   But the wild card is the al-Qaeda aligned militant groups in the Palestinian camps, notably Fatah al-Islam.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have goals in Lebanon (and the region) that oppose each other.   But in the chaotic and dangerous politics of Lebanon, the old cliche of your enemy’s enemy being your friend holds true.  Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia want to see a revival of the Lebanese Civil War with al-Qaeda in the mix, a group over whom neither of them can wield much control.    So it seems they are willing to work together to put Michel Sulieman (or another acceptable candidate) in the President’s office.   It may be true that Syria is still somewhere behind the assassination of Francois al-Hajj, but Iran and Hajji Ahmadinejad seem willing to rein in their weaker, still aggressive client.

This is, of course, speculation.  But when investigating Middle Eastern politics, one has to keep in mind the criss-crossing connections.

A short, brighter note on Iran: when we think of Iran we tend to think of mullahs and maybe some brave student groups.  But it is good to remember that Iran and its expat community are engaged in a vibrant debate.   I came across this site, Gozaar, dedicated to Iranian human rights.  Haven’t gone through it all, but found a fascinating article on “positive nationalism” (like in Robert Reich’s formulation, for example).   The author wants to “preserve positive nationalism as a moderate force and to incorporate democratic and secular values into it.”  It is an interesting look at Iranian identity, and, as in-depth as it is, seems almost relieving to trying to figure out the bizarre political machinations of current politics.