Middle East

Clearly, not everything in the Middle East centers around terrorism, despite the impression one might get from the news or even at times this blog.  However,  it obviously is a very real phenomenon, and understanding it is key.  In light of that, I’m linking today to a fairly new publication called Perspectives on Terrorism, the journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative (disclosure: the current author is a new member and will have an article on al-Qaeda in Yemen published there in February, but he urges readers not to hold that against them).   This journal does not deal entirely with the Middle East, which is right, but there is a good bit about it, including Robert Kelly’s look at Iraq’s tribal structure and Nicole Stracke’s discussion of Arab prisons.  

Marc Lynch has an article in the Christian Science Monitor on US policy toward Iran vis a vis the Gulf States.   The thesis is essentially that the Gulf States have shifted their policy toward Iran to one of pragmatic accomadation (though not friendship).

Lynch writes:

The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are accommodating themselves to Iran’s growing weight in the region’s politics. They remain key parts of America’s security architecture in the region, hosting massive US military bases and underwriting the American economy in exchange for protection. But as Saudi analyst Khalid al-Dakheel argues, they are no longer content sitting passively beneath the US security umbrella and want to avoid being a pawn in the US-Iranian struggle for power. Flush with cash, they are not interested in a war that would mess up business.

I find this idea very hard to disagree with.  Even though it seems just like yesterday that the Sauds and others were lining up to fight the “Shi’ite Crescent”, and are still weary of Iran, they are consumate pragmatists, and never need a weathervane to know which way the wind blows. 

This point is hammered home by Christian Koch of the Gulf Research Center (.pdf file), who writes that Iran no longer threatens the GCC’s sense of purpose.

 These two articles are I think surely correct, but, just as it turned out to be wrong in the long run to talk about the anti-Iran axis as a permanent feature, we shouldn’t go talking about this development as anything other than a trend, something that could change at any moment. 

The Yemen Times has a recent profile on Sheik al-Ahmar’s son, a very relevant man following the recent death of his father, the second-most powerful person in Yemen.   The author, Abdullah al-Faqeh, is a professor of politics at Sana’a University and very clearly a fan of young Hamid.  In the last post on the al-Ahmar clan, commentor Gregory postulates that Hamid is the best bet of the late Sheik’s six sons to assume power over the Hashid tribal federation, but thinks that his image of a modern and international businessman might hurt him.  While al-Faqeh doesn’t address this, he clearly thinks Hamid al-Ahmar can be a bridge between Yemen’s past and present.  Here is a longish quote.

While accompanying the Joint Meeting Parties’ presidential candidate engineer Faisal bin Shamlan in his camping trail across Yemen, Hameed seemed to have redefined the contemporary politics of Yemen. He proved the old slogan of tribal politics, which states “my nephew and I are against the outsider,” to be inaccurate. The most telling moment, probably in the politics of modern Yemen, occurred in the summer of 2006 when Hameed with the support of some of his brothers mobilized tens of thousands of Hashid’s tribesmen for the opposition parties’ presidential candidate bin Shamlan’s campaign stop in the city of Amran to the north of the capital of Yemen—Sana’a.

It is true that Saleh is the one who decided to shift from the politics of consensus to the politics of competition. It is truer, however, that junior Al-ahmer is the one who defined what the politics of competition looks like today and will look like in the future. And, while the door for reconciliation of differences among the younger generation of Hashid is not completely closed, the likelihood of reconciliation and a return to the politics of consensus seems remote. The best the sons of Hashid can hope for in the future is not the impossible return to the politics of consensus, but the attainable goal of acceptance of the right and legitimacy of the role of each other.
This puts Hamid in a very interesting light, one where it may not be a question of whether or not he can consolidate support like his father, but where he may in fact reshape the idea of the tribal and political system in Yemen.  I can’t even begin to speculate if he is up to it- power corrupts, after all, and even if it doesn’t not everyone lives up to their early potential.   And, as discussed below, the avalanche of disaster Yemen is facing may prevent everything.   But he is worth keeping his eye on.

The Gulf Research Center has published a series of articles Nuclearization of the Gulf, which can be downloaded for free as a .pdf file from their main page, or you can order a hard copy if you want something impressive on your bookshelf.    Interesting and comprehensive site in and of itself, and the paper looks very interesting.  The contents are…
- Nuclear Development in the Gulf: A Strategic or Economic Necessity

- Official Documents on the GWMD Free Zone

(Apologies for the delay in posting- have been out of town)

A leader dies in a Muslim country, one in which chaos always seems a possible destiny, in a time of frail uncertainty, leaving the country in a new and vertiginous and dangerous world.   This is case in Pakistan, with the unsolved murder of Benazir Bhutto, but it is also the story in Yemen.

In Yemen it is the death of Sheik Abdullah bin-Hussein al-Ahmar, the speaker of Parliament, the founder an head of the Islah opposition party- which is Islamic but not Islamist- and the second most powerful man in Yemen.   Al-Ahmar was the leader of the Hashid tribal federation, Yemen’s largest and most powerful- the tribe to which President Ali Abdullah Saleh belongs.

This death is important for a number of reasons.  The most immediate and obvious of course is that in a country as fragile as Yemen any tear in the established order can send things out of control.    Yemen is lucky- something I am not sure I have ever said before- in that al-Ahmar’s death won’t lead to a sudden loss in power for the Hashid federation, thus lowering the chance for revolt.

To say that tribes play an important part in Yemeni politics is basically saying the the media plays a large role in US elections- that is, it is something that doesn’t need to be said.  And what al-Ahmar could do is unite and rally tribes under his flag.   Politics in Yemen involve the constant art of negotiation and alliance-building  between tribes and other groups (the north is far more tribal than the south).   In the ongoing revolt in Sa’ada Saleh has been constantly bargaining with the tribal leaders to aid him in his war.

Al-Ahmar was a genius in this.  The way tribal allegiances work one can see al-Ahmar, analogous to a ward boss in Daley’s Chicago or during Tammany Hall days.  He wasn’t delivering votes, per se, but backing.  And though Islah was an opposition party, on the highest levels it worked in tandem with Saleh.

Perhaps most importantly, al-Ahmar was the main go-between Yemen had with its most important relationship, that of Saudi Arabia.  We tend to think that every country’s most important relationship is with the US, but that is rarely the case.  Yemen has a difficult history with the rich giant to its north, with Saleh and the House of Saud enjoying mutual acrimony.   Al-Ahmar was the bridge between them.  Indeed, he died in a Riyadh hospital.

So he was many things to his country. We will see if his son is as well.    Saba is reporting that

The Son of the late parliament speaker, Hamid al-Ahmar has called on all Yemeni tribes to sign a one-year truce agreement during which they can put an end to revenge cases and tribal conflicts throughout the country, the independent al-Ghad newspaper reported on Wednesday. 

Whether or not the tribes listen to Hamid’s call- or whether they do anything beside fluff it off with the merest lip services, will go a long way to determining if anyone can even partly fill the shoes of the old man.   If the Hashid federation doesn’t retain even an element of stability, neither will Yemen.

Which brings us to perhaps the most crucial point- al-Ahmar was old and Saleh is getting up there himself.  Al-Ahmar has been grooming his son as Saleh is grooming his.   Ignoring the nepotism, the plain fact is that Yemen is beginning to see a shift in the two personalities that have dominated its public life for decades, and who are largely responsible for giving it whatever element of stability it has.

Yemen, in the next few years will face a raft of problems, from running out of water to seeing a huge population explosion.   Both of these will exacerbate Yemen’s problems with development, and in a worst-case though not-unlikely scenario even destroy their chances.   These multiple challenges, which would challenge even the most stable states, will also be a gigantic boon for al-Qaeda, which thrives in chaos.

And that is the problem: it is not only al-Qaeda which is undergoing a generational shift- the leadership of the country is as well.  The question is not only if the new leaders, be they the sons or anyone else, are capable of handling the challenges, it is whether or not they will even be allowed to.   Yemen has made attempts at democracy, and the public is irritated when the young Ahmad bin-Ali Abdullah Saleh is touted as the next President.  Whether by allegiance,raw power, or actual democratic transition, it will be very difficult for the next generation of leaders to consolidate legitimate and actual power.  And this instability and uncertainty is the last thing Yemen needs as it tries to face its myriad catastrophes growling behind the next bend.