Of all of Iraq's myriad impossible situations, Kirkuk has America tied into perhaps its tightest Gordian Knot.   The Institute for War and Peace Reporting has a good little summary of the mutual frustration between Kurdistan and whatever passes as Iraq's central government. 

The Kurdish Alliance, the second-largest political bloc in the country, holds 53 of Baghdad parliament's 275 seats and are members of Maliki's Shia-led government. The recent tensions have damaged one of the strongest alliances in Iraq's severely fractured political landscape.The political disputes have simmered since last summer, escalating over the past few weeks. While Kurdish leaders insist they won't pull out of Maliki's government, they are growing increasingly vocal with their demands."I wouldn't call it a crisis, but there are ups and downs and mistrust between the two sides," said Qassim Dawd, an Iraqi parliament MP from the Maliki's United Iraqi Alliance list.

And, of course, central places in a national consciousness are only heightened by a shared history of suffering.   The battle of Kosovo Pjole maintains a major part of the Serbian national mythology, and was used my Milosevic to re-awaken Serbian nationalism.

 And the Serbs lostthat battle.  And it took place in 1389.   The tragedy of Kirkuk, in which Saddam uprooted as many as 100,000 Kurds during his Arabization programs (in tandem with thegenocidal Anfal campaign), has made it a place of sorrow and pain and longing.  

The US feels it owes the Kurds, who have been loyal and incredibly helpful to US goals, something.  A lot, actually.  But to re-Kurd Kirkuk would be just as traumatic to its Arab and Turkmen population.   This has already begun to happen, according to the Council on Foriegn Relations.

Since the removal of Saddam in 2003, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Kurds and Turkmen returned to Kirkuk to reclaim their lost properties or reside in camps on the eastern fringe of the city. Some experts say their motivation is to rebalance the city's population in preparation for the December 2007 referendum. Most experts say Kurds now make up a clear majority and retain control over most of the city's important political posts (because of a ruling allowing around 70,000 displaced Kurds to vote despite not residing in the city).  

(that CFR article is also a neat little summary of Kirkuk's issues).

If the US allows Kurds their prize it may continue to tear up to government and the country.  If it doesn't the fiercely independent Kurds, so close to their national dream of independence, may tear it apart anyway.  Right now the Kurds are playing ball, but no one knows for how long, and it seems, considering their historical suffering and their current position as strong allies, few have the indecency to ask.

 (Update: The New York Times has a good article on how the Kurds might have over-played their hand, and are now letting their long-term goals slip away.)

A security wall on the border between Gaza and Egypt was destroyed today, freeing the people of the trapped and desperate Strip to…shop.   Though this seems prosaic, it is vitally important to the people of Gaza, suffering under Israeli blockades (themselves a response to constant rocket attacks).    The border has turned into a bizarre bazaar, as both Palestinian and Egyptian security forces are looking the other way, if not helping out the spree.    It is suspected by both Palestinians and Israeli's that Hamas was responsible for tearing down the wall, which, if true, is a smart play.   The people of Gaza were suffering, and whether they choose to blame Israel or their own government's obstinate militancy, it is the local government that feel the wrath of the people.   Today opened up a huge safety valve, relieving pressure.   It also gives Hamas a play, as according to Ha’aretz, “Hamas’ Damascus-based political leader Khaled Meshal said Wednesday that his organization would be willing to work to resolve the chaotic situation on the Gaza-Egypt border, but only if the border were placed under exclusive Palestinian and Egyptian control.”     Smart play by Hamas. 

To the store!

A New York Times article today portrays the United Nations as being upset at Algeria for not providing enough security in the run-up to last month's bombing of the body's Algerian offices. 

A senior United Nations official said Wednesday that the Algerian government had ignored repeated requests to close off the streets outside the organization's building in Algiers in the months before a suicide car bombing there last month killed 17 staff members.

"They didn't say, "no,' they simply didn't respond," said the official, Kemal Dervis, leader of the United Nations Development Program, whose offices there were hit by the blast on Dec. 11.

Needless to say, the Algerian government is not too happy with this assessment, and wants to be able to participate in the panel the UN is organizing.   This comes as Algeria is seeing a rise in attacks by Islamists (including the murder last week of three people picking chestnuts, a seemingly random massacre that uncomfortably echoes some of the slaughter of the civil war in the 90's). 

An article in the new edition of Perspectives on Terrorism describes what it calls “The Algerian Scenario”.  It's author, Francesco Cavatorta, describes the response the region had to Algeria's civil war (read these for background and for interesting studies on the war, and this is a pretty good book). 

Anyway, Cavatorta writes:

Ruling regimes across the Middle East and North Africa came to recognize that they enjoyed very little internal legitimacy and that quickly opening up the political system , such as in the case of Algeria - would backfire. Thus, they opted instead for eliminating the Islamists (i.e., Tunisia), for co-optation (i.e., Morocco) or for a mix of the two strategies. No regime risked a full liberalization that would have included an Islamist party running in competitive elections. The Islamists themselves largely opted for political participation under authoritarian constraints in order to satisfy the "security" guarantees regimes needed (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and Egypt).

I think this is accurate.  Obviously, regimes in the region were aware of the Islamist danger before the Algerian Civil War, and before the 1990's were not exactly in a rush to open up their political systems (Egypt’ Mubarak had already had in place his emergency law for 10 years), but the sudden and stark brutality of the Algerian war clearly demonstrated the nightmare scenario. 

And it is happening again, albeit in a new world.  Cavatorta writes that signs point to a  ”lack of legitimacy that the current ruling elites enjoy and indicates that there is a vast gulf between the appearance of Algeria as a stable semi-democracy with a functioning market economy and the reality. It is because of this gulf that Islamism still exercises considerable appeal for ordinary citizens. While it has been driven largely underground, it still represents a significant challenge and once the legacy of the 1990s civil war will have faded, [14] it is likely to come back with a vengeance. The creation of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb might just be the first sign. “

AQIM, responsible for the December bombings, is the new wave of Algerian Islamism, and would like to spread to the other North African countries.   Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and others have to have a plan for how to deal with this, as well as other threats- Islamic and otherwise (see yesterday's NYT story about the perils of bread subsidies in Egypt).  Iran has been justifiably dominating the headlines and underscores much of the policy-planning in the region, but older, reformed threats from the not-very-distant past are rearing their heads again.   And, sadly, Algeria seems to once again be the harbinger of an ugly future.

On a slightly better note, I can take this opportunity to recommend the late Tahar Djaout's novel The Last Summer of Reason.   This is a small and beautiful novel about a bookseller whose life is ruined by the rise of Islamists in Algeria.   It never actually says Algeria, or mentions the FIS (instead using the haunting name “The Vigilant Brothers”).  It is a terrifying fable of the destruction of art and literature based on a strict, sword-driven moral code.   It was published after Djaout's 1993 death at the hands of Islamists, who said he ”wielded a fearsome pen that could have an effect on Islamic sectors”.   So, ok- this isn't that bright of a note: the world he feared came to pass in a very personal way.   But the bright thing is that, like with Bulgakov, his manuscript didn't burn, but shows light and inspiration even in dark and weary times.   

Be sure to check out this article by Claude Salhani in the Middle East Times.   Relevant to Bush's Middle East trip, a large part of which was dedicated to shoring Gulf states’ support for solidarity against Iran, it is titled “What Does Iran Want?”

That's a damn good question, and Salhani addresses it in his short article.   He toys with the idea of Shi’ite unity and of the tactical defense having a nuclear weapon would provide.   But it is at the end of his article that he comes up with a thesis not mentioned nearly often enough. 

The Iranian Revolution is fed by perpetual upheaval. Like any revolution, if it stops, it dies. This may partially explain the regime's involvement in fomenting unrest so that it can sustain itself. The greatest danger to the Islamic Revolution are not threats of a military invasion by the United States. Quite the contrary. These threats only strengthen the regime by awakening nationalist feelings. Indeed, the biggest danger to the Iranian regime would be for the United States to normalize relations with Iran.

That is an excellent point.  Most regimes, however lofty their goals may be when taking the throne, devolve into a desperate battle to retain power.  Not all revolutions are the same, but most fizzle into similar entropic states.    Keeping up tension is the only way to even partially sustain the energy needed to keep perpetual motion.    There are surely many factors to Iran wanting to be a major player in the Gulf, and for its support for Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria et al, but when planning policy toward Iran it is important to remember that one of its motivations is merely the continuation of power.   It is vital not to play into that. 

In the current Yemen Times, Hassan al-Haifi has a short editorial on the need for change in the Arab World.   I link to it for a couple of reasons.  One, basically, is that it is always interesting to read critical articles in the mainstream Arab press.  We tend to think that no one is allowed to speak their mind, that the press marches in lockstep with the ruler- and, by and large, this can be true, depending on the country.  There are ways to work around that, though, and Yemen for one actually has a lively and active opposition press.   It is still verbotento criticize President Ali Abdullah Saleh directly, but there are ways to work around that. 

Now, then: Hassan al-Haifi.   When I lived in Yemen, I used to make fun of him, both verbally and in print .  More than a bit purplish, I described him as ” important to read because he captures all of the flop-sweated conspiratorial nightmare gibberish of the old Arab nationalist myths in each of his columns, refusing to believe anything that doesn't fit his original thesis.”  And to a large extent this is still true, though (a little older, now) I might describe it a little differently.  Rare is a column of his that doesn't blame something- anything- on the Zionists. 

 So what makes him interesting?  Well, he is an ardent anti-Zionist, but also fiercely hates the stagnant Arab regimes and Islamic terrorism.   So he really doesn't fit into any easy category.  It is fair to think that most people in the Arab world are more or less like him- no great fan of America, but no great fan of its enemies either.  Of course, the major actors in the Arab/Muslim world are not like this, but it is important to realize that the people America needs to win over don't fall into simple categories.

 Al-Haifi's column begins with a fascinating paragraph, which I will quote at length, which I think helps illustrate the complexities and contradictions that America faces in its efforts to win the fabled hearts and minds.

 IIt is becoming indeed that after almost eight years of sloppy governance in the United States, the American people are relying on their genuinely democratic institutions to come out of the abyss brought on by the incompetence and sheer arrogance of the Bush Administration (and the Zionist machine behind it). Yes the word "change" is having strong resonance in the pre-election primaries by which the leading American political parties are choosing their favored candidates for the office of the Presidency in the United States. It is imperative that we just do not recognize this as a significant development for the United States, but an important lesson by which to learn that unless the people have the final say in the adjudication of their leaders there is no sense in believing that indeed governance is meaningful otherwise. The significance of the current American political exercise is that the word "change" is the dominating influence in creating the choice of the electors. Even the candidates from the party of the incumbent President in the White House are unfailing in detecting the widespread desire for a change for the better, and they are quick to also adopt the platform of "change" to respond to this broad based desire. 
This- this is oddly inspiring, isn't it?  Al-Haifi praises America and is almost awed at the idea of change, that despite what he sees as the nightmare of the last 8 years, the country can re-invent itself for the better.   This is the message America needs to promote, this message of constant improvement, if it wants to improve its image in the Middle East.   It isn't enough to promote people like the brave Saad Ibrahim or Kanan Makiya- we need to support them, but true western-style democrats are in the minority.   US policy needs to be geared toward people who have a grudging, reluctant respect for the country, tempered by years of disilusionement both justified and not, but who have yet to turn completely away.  Anything else is just a pipe dream. 
 

The President is concluding the Israel/Palestinian portion of his Middle East trip, before moving on the Gulf to deal with Iran.   Bush feels confident that there will be a Palestinian state and a peace treaty before he leaves office in slightly more than a year, saying “'there's going to be a signed peace treaty by the time I leave office,’ stressing that Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will ‘make tough choices in order for there to be lasting peace.’” (Middle East Times)

To this author, this kind of rhetoric seems typically worrisome, infused with the idea that merely believing something is enough to make it happen.   And, as a New York Times story says , the Palestinians don't much believe it either.  “‘He has destroyed everything, and now he is coming to see the results," said Moussa Al Hilou, 63, a clothing store owner. ‘What Palestinian state is he talking about? What he says is nonsense, even our leadership knows that.’"

Bush, as the Israeli paper Haaretz reports, is not happy with Bush being there, for reason ranging from the grand- they believe he is the most Israeli-biased President in history- to the prosaic: his arrival has prompted massive (justified) security measures.

“Ala, who lives nearby, said Preventive Security personnel had been moving from house to house for the past few days and taking down residents’ names.
‘We were asked not to go out onto the balconies or the roofs. We are not allowed to go into the street, either,’ he said. 'that criminal, George Bush, has put us under curfew. The Israelis are not enough - now him, too. He is destroying the world and he will yet be tried for his crimes,’ he added.” 

I don't see much coming out of this, other than an attempt at a legacy.  Bush is too unpopular and hard-feelings are too ingrained for anything to happen here (with everything else that has happened, it is somewhat incredible to realize that George W. Bush has been the President thoughout almost all of the events starting with the second intifada). 

 What he did do though was call for an end to the occupation, and said that “a Palestinian state had to be contiguous. 'swiss cheese isn't going to work when it comes to the territory of a state.’   This is probably not the single most eloquent framing of this issue I have ever read, but it is still meaningful for a US President to acknowledge it.   Whomever the next President is, he or she will have to pick up where Bush falteringly and belatedly began.

(As Bush moves into the Gulf, we will be doing an in-depth look at Gulf issues, especially regarding Iran.  Excited?  You bet you are!)

The Institute of War and Peace Reporting has a new series called Iraqi Women's Voices.  The first one, also printed in the Middle East Times, is called “Life After the Islamic State,” about a woman whose Baghdad neighborhood, once secular and free of the Sunni-Shi’ite divide, fell under the sway of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

My parents are liberal and never told me what to wear, so I enjoyed a lot of freedom growing up. The new restrictions were difficult for me to take. I have complied with the new "laws" of my neighbourhood, while my blood silently boiled.

It was one of the worst times of my life, and I hope that it remains a thing of the past.

She reports that things have improved as the security situation has gotten better.  It is worth a read, and we will keep our eye on this series.

An editorial in today's Middle East Times nails it:

And if indeed the president's concern is the Arab-Israeli dispute, then why the stops in four Gulf countries? Why the visits to Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia? It is interesting to note that those four countries share the same concerns over Iran's rising influence in the region.

…Bush's visit to the region — the Gulf region, that is — might well have more to do with Iran than with the question of Palestine.

Iran has become the single-biggest issue for policy-makers in the region- possibly even more than Iraq.  Bush would love an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal to his legacy, but the real interest is Iran.    The maneuvering between the Gulf States- along with the broader Arab world- and Iran changes on a day-to-day basis.  My guess is Bush wants to shore up support and make some kind of cohesive policy.   He must not like the new willingness to at least partially co-operate with the Iranian government. 

This is especially true in light of the confrontation between the US Navy and the speedboats of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp.  According to the US Navy “as the Iranian boats neared the American vessels, a radio threat was issued that the American ships would explode. The verbal warnings broadcast over the internationally recognized bridge-to-bridge radio channel said, "I am coming at you, and you will explode in a few minutes.”

 The Iranian government has denied this.

“What happened between the Guards and foreign vessels was an ordinary identification,” Ali Reza Tangsiri, commander of the Guards naval forces in the region, told the Mehr news agency.

“No special engagement took place between the Guards and the foreign side,” he said, adding that the Guards naval forces had a right to control and identify “any vessel entering Persian Gulf waters” to the northwest.  (AFP)

Tensions are rising in anticipation of Bush's visit.  Iran is now, and will remain for at least the rest of his term, at the front of the President's mind.

Interested in knowing why Lebanon frequently has the difficulties it does?  Pay attention to the last sentence excerpted here.

From The Daily Star

Iranian official to meet Assad to discuss Lebanon


Saturday, January 05, 2008

ROME: Ali Larijani, member of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council and adviser to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, will visit Damascus on Saturday to discuss with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad the situation in Lebanon, according to a report published by the Italian news Agency AKI on Friday. “The visit also aims to formulate coordinating stances between Syria and Teheran in this regard,” AKI said. Larijani is also set to meet with Syrian Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem and some Palestinian officials. “He may also meet with some Lebanese officials who might travel to Damascus for this purpose,” the agency added. - Agencies

If one is rooting for Lebanon to get past the scars and divisions of its past- a difficult goal under any circumstances- one could note with bitter cynicism the decency, the sheer graciousness that Larijani might meet with some representatives of the country about which he is co-ordinating policy. 

 But Syria isn't dealing only with Iran.  The Arab League is meeting on Sunday, and Lebanon will be at the top of the agenda, according to the Daily Star.   It will be interesting to see what their statement- which, anyway, carries little wieght- will be.  On the one hand the Arab League is generally reluctant to criticize another Arab state, but despite some thawing the Arab states are still leery of Iran, so might be in a bind on how to treat Syria.  A decent hint though comes from Arab league Secretary Amr Moussa, who “told Al-Arabiyya television Thursday that solving Lebanon's problem was a Lebanese, an Arab, a regional and an international responsibility. ‘While we acknowledge there are conflicting interests and foreign [involvement], Lebanese politicians bear the responsibility first [for their country] before Arab, regional and international politicians.’”

 This of course is taking a large burden off of Syria and punting the issue down the road, which does nothing to help Lebanon.   The country is basing itself for a large march by the opposition, led by Hassan Nasrallah's Hezbollah.  Tony Bey at Beirut2Bayside discusses it thusly:

It's very clear that this is the Syrian order of operations, as it was the Syrian regime's orphaned pitbulls — Naser Qandil, Wi’am Wahhab, Suleiman Frangieh and the mukhabarat rag al-Diyar — who were enthusiastically announcing the marching orders.

It was interesting to hear that clown Qandil (who will likely end up in jail for his role in the Hariri assassination) try to base this on Nasrallah's latest imbecilic and pitiful interview. This point was accurately noted in the NOW editorial:

Is it us, or did you also sense that Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, in his interview on Wednesday night, was walking a fine line between Syrian priorities and Iran's apparent desire to avoid a breakdown in Lebanon? If we are right, Nasrallah's threat to take to the streets is a sop to Syria…

In other words, the order is Syrian par excellence. But Qandil laying this at Nasrallah's feet, aside from showing just how much they need his cover to have any weight at all in the country, shows just how much Syria is pressuring Nasrallah to blow up the place. His lame balancing act in his interview was a reflection of this.

Bey, as always, uses delightfully strident language, but the point is there: Syria and Iran most likely want different things with Lebanon, as do the other Arab countries (as does the US and EU).   It seems that Lebanon is no closer to ending its run as political testing ground than the heady days after Hariri was killed.