Middle East

An Oliver Guitta article in the Middle East Times from yesterday analyzes the ascent of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, particularly Algeria (Here is an earlier post about the Dec 11th Algiers bombings).   Basically, the thrust of the article is that al-Qaeda is consolidating its influence in the region, and that “One of its primary goals is to federate the main terror organizations in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya in order to attain full regional reach.”   I personally doubt that this will ever really be the case, as one of the toughest things to do in the world is to get a bunch of disjointed revolutionaries to fall under one flag, even if it is that of bin Laden.  I’ll get into that more in a later post.

 But one of the more interesting passages in the article is this, which I will quote at some length.

And the Dec. 11 spectacular double suicide bombings in Algiers against the United Nations and Algeria’s constitutional court are the latest proof of AQIM’s potential to create chaos in North Africa.

The symbolical aspect of these attacks is very important. First, Dec. 11, 1960 is a crucial date in Algeria’s history of independence from France. The constitutional court happens to be located on the December 11 Boulevard.

And most importantly the “11th” factor is one of al-Qaida’s hallmarks: not only for 9/11 in the United States, but also for 3/11 in Madrid and AQIM’s suicide attacks on 3/11 in Casablanca, 4/11 in Algiers, 7/11 in Lakhdaria in Algeria and now 12/11.

AQIM has succeeded in creating an “11″ psychosis; some in Algeria even describe the 11th as “the date of the devil.”

Now, this is interesting.  When the 3/11 Madrid attacks hit, there was a lot of conspiratorial kerfluffle and internet numerological time-wastery, and it was easily dismissed.   That stuff is fun to an extent, but meaningless (Oh! Here’s one! Allende was overthrown in Chile on 9/11 in 1973- that is the date of CIA underground ops, obviously).  People are conditioned to look for patterns, as they provide a level of comfort in times of chaos.  Even if we don’t like the order, the idea that human events are controlled by grand plans is a strangely reassuring one. 

But all the “11’s” in ALgeria might actually conform to something.  I would imagine it was a coincidence at first, but terrorists are often not dummies.  When there are random explosions, people are scared but it isn’t always at the forefront of the mind.  But if there is a specific day every month, the lead-up can become unbearable.   And that, after all, is one of terrorism’s main goals.

Secondarily, forcing a pattern onto the chaos can help if the goal of AQIM is really to consolidate power in the Maghreb.   It makes them seem more powerful and competent.   It can help bring splinter groups under their umbrella.

 Again, though, this is just light Christmas speculation. 

Interesting story on grafitti art on NPR this morning. In Bethlehem, Israel’s security wall is being tagged by both international and local artists, in what can be seen as a display of defiance or, alternately, just an outlet for frustrated young people. You can listen to and read the story

A British grafitti artist (I suppose that is the proper term) is there, painting scenes such as a young girl frisking an Israeli soldier or a donkey having his ID card checked. Listening to the story I was a little irritated by this, because I didn’t care much for the idea of Banksy, as he is known, dropping in and showing the Palestinians the kind of art that meant something. Looking at the pictures, though, I had to concede they have, regardless of politics, a certain artistic merit. Even if you divorce the conflict and whatever your opinions are, the strangely neutral tone of the little girl in a pink dress frisking a soldier- and with both free of local iconography- presents a kind of fascinating dissonance.

(Eric Westervelt, NPR)

There are other paintings as well, many other paintings, including a escalator taking a bunch of sillouhetes over the wall and a giant bug knocking over a row of dominoes that could, but don’t have to, represent the security wall (kind of a Kafka-David Lynch-Abu Mazen mashup, if you will).

(Eric Westervelt, NPR)

My personal favorite, though, is this one, from an artist named “Sam 3″.

(Eric Westervelt, NPR)

That is, of course, Jake LaMotta preparing to take a punch from Sugar Ray Robinson. Robinson fought LaMotta six times (watch a clip of them fighting here, if you are a fan of the sweet science).

Why do I like this one so much? Because the bulk of the story is about Israel preventing suicide bombers, the economy of Palestine in general and Bethlehem specifically being choked (a source of frustration especially now, Christmas being the height of Bethlehem’s tourist season) and the usual Israel/Palestine storylines. And those do need to be talked about, of course, and are of dizzying importance. But it is nice to think that someone there, for whatever reason, decided to spend his or her (his) time immortalizing one of boxing’s great rivalries, for no reason other than the love of painting and the excitement he or she (he) feels about the sport. For me, that is a better Christmas message than any piety, real or show.

(caveat: CNN has a story today about tourism in Bethlehem being up this holiday season.)

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has released the first issue of The Sentinel, a scholarly look at terrorism around the world.   A pdf copy of it can be downloaded here.   Of particular interest is page 14, where Gregory Johnsen- late of this site- has a rigorous look at “Securing Yemen’s Co-operation in the Second Phase of the War on Al-Qaeda”.     This article looks at the changing nature of al-Qaeda in Yemen, looking at what some are calling a generational shift , and how Yemen has to deal with it.  The overall thrust of the publication is US policy, and how to combat and defeat terrorism.   Johnsen’s article is no exception, and is a good and sober guide at how to look at situational realities instead of having an overbearing blanket approach.

In an article later this week we’ll look more into the idea of a generational split in Yemen, and whether or not Yemen is becoming the new base for al-Qaeda, a notion that has been gaining some traction. 

Today brought the shocking and completely unexpected news that Vladimir Putin has agreed to become the Prime Minister of Russia when his term ends next year.  That isn’t the only news to come out of Russia today- though I know the reader may want to take a few seconds to recover from that twist- and much of the news involves topics on this blog.   Russia today also helped solidify its ties with Iran, completing its first fuel delivery to Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant.   The Times  reports that it is “unclear when the controversial station would begin operating.”  But Iran News Daily previously reported “According to Russian forecasts, the first reactor at the Bushehr plant could be started up in 2008 and nuclear fuel would have to be shipped to Bushehr six months ahead of time.”   So, with that timetable, Bushehr can be online by June.

The Times also reports that Putin has helped open a pipeline for Russian Muslims to make it to Mecca for the hajj- a huge turnaround from the Soviet days, when only 18 pilgrims a year were granted visas.   As Russia tries to expand its influence, it would like to be a broker in the Middle East, establishing ties with both Iran and Saudi Arabia.   Though the war in Chechnya has left Putin considered an enemy, he has recently made a lot of moves to restore relations with Muslims in Russia.   Here is a transcript of a November meeting between Putin and Muslim leaders in Russia.   Most of it is boilerplate speeches, but the point is Putin is at least making gestures.   He thanks them for “your important contribution to the moral education of our citizens, for your actions in the fight against all forms of extreme currents of thought, and for what you do in the fight against extremism. This certainly strengthens the unity of Russian society.”     There are of course internal Russian reasons for reaching out to its restive Muslim population, but it would also be difficult to expand relations with powerful countries in the Middle East if the Muslims in his control were all revolting.

For the first time since the revolution of 1979, a sitting Iranian President has been invited to participate in the hajj.  King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia has extended an invitation to the head of his regional rival, a gesture one could think is the triumph of religion over politics, but, in reality, is just the opposite.

Saudi Arabia has long worried about Iran’s Shi’ite revolution,  especially in light of an oil-rich Iran taking advantage of a weakened America to spread its regional influence.   So worried, in fact, that the House of Saud agreed to fund Sunni militants in Lebanon and Palestine to fight against their Iran-backed Shi’ite rivals.   This was chronicled by Seymour Hersh in a March New Yorker article.

But, it seems the National Intelligence Estimate has changed everything, or at least the perception of everything.   The ides that Iran is no longer actively engaged in the pursuit of nuclear weapons has given some breathing room to monarchs worried about regional confrontation.   It is hard to imagine Abdallah extending this invitation without the estimate.   This is not to say that the Gulf Arab states are no longer terrified of Iran.  Max Boot, just returning from a trip to the Gulf Region, reports that “some of those most worried about the mullahs wear flowing headdresses, not yarmulkes, and they have good cause for concern, notwithstanding the sanguine tilt many news accounts put on the NIE.”

So, then: what?  If Saudi Arabia is still scared of Iran, and whose oil dollars are still the biggest obstacle to Iran’s plans for regional dominance, why are they breaking bread together?  Because Middle Eastern politics are not as straightforward as one would like: enemies can work together for another goal.  The Middle Eastern Times reported that “Lebanese analysts expect that Ahmadinejad’s Hajj pilgrimage this month will help the anti- and pro-Western politicians in Lebanon to come closer to electing a president and to formulate an agenda and lineup for a new cabinet”.  This confused me.  Saudi Arabia is still the biggest regional financial backer of  Saad Hariri’s Future Party, and Iran is the sponsor of his two biggest foes, Syria and Hezbollah.   But the wild card is the al-Qaeda aligned militant groups in the Palestinian camps, notably Fatah al-Islam.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have goals in Lebanon (and the region) that oppose each other.   But in the chaotic and dangerous politics of Lebanon, the old cliche of your enemy’s enemy being your friend holds true.  Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia want to see a revival of the Lebanese Civil War with al-Qaeda in the mix, a group over whom neither of them can wield much control.    So it seems they are willing to work together to put Michel Sulieman (or another acceptable candidate) in the President’s office.   It may be true that Syria is still somewhere behind the assassination of Francois al-Hajj, but Iran and Hajji Ahmadinejad seem willing to rein in their weaker, still aggressive client.

This is, of course, speculation.  But when investigating Middle Eastern politics, one has to keep in mind the criss-crossing connections.

A short, brighter note on Iran: when we think of Iran we tend to think of mullahs and maybe some brave student groups.  But it is good to remember that Iran and its expat community are engaged in a vibrant debate.   I came across this site, Gozaar, dedicated to Iranian human rights.  Haven’t gone through it all, but found a fascinating article on “positive nationalism” (like in Robert Reich’s formulation, for example).   The author wants to “preserve positive nationalism as a moderate force and to incorporate democratic and secular values into it.”  It is an interesting look at Iranian identity, and, as in-depth as it is, seems almost relieving to trying to figure out the bizarre political machinations of current politics.

Today’s Asharq Al-aswat has an interesting and disturbing article about al-Qaeda shifting its base to the Gulf, or, more precisely, Yemen.  It quotes an anonymous official saying he “believes that Yemen may replace Afghanistan as the incubator to breed, rally and train [terrorists]. In practice, Yemen could become the new Al Qaeda base- a label once reserved for Afghanistan.”  Most observers have tended to think the new base for The Base would be Pakistan, but it is good to remember the (possibly fake) hadith: “When disorder threatens, seek refuge in Yemen“.  

On a brighter note, the American University in Cairo has come out with its list of newly published books.   These range from ancient Egyptian history to a look at 19th-Century Egyptian Theatre to modern politics, with the latest in Arabic literature scattered in.  There also seems to be several books about the late Naguib Mafouz, including a series of conversations with him during his last hospital stay.  Worth checking out. 

Finally, the Boston Review has a long article by Abbas Milani about Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.   Milani explains how Ahmadinejad was shaped by the history of Iran in his lifetime- both its political and economic upheavals.  (with what is almost an aside about how the Shah’s modernization led to a massive influx into the cities- one of those little pieces of history that are massively important but often go unnoticed).   In doing so, he places Ahmadinejad squarely in the Iranian experience, and helps explains what he means for the country’s present and future.    On the subject, be sure to check out Ahmadinejad’s blog.   It isn’t as interesting as one would hope, though he does seem to be writing more, explaining “Since my last post on the blog, a few months have passed. But this doesn’t ‎mean that I have not been keeping my promise of spending fifteen minutes per week ‎on it”.    More instructive are the side-comments, with people either praising him or wishing that he would “die slowly”. 

Apologies for this blog being Lebanon-centric these last couple of days; however, when the testing ground of Arab ideologies teeters on the brink of its most intense political crisis in 17 years, it calls for many words.

And there have been a lot of words regarding the assassination of Francois al-Hajj and its confusing implications. Over at Tony Bey’s Beirut 2Bayside, the fingerprints of Syria are all over this. As he explains, “The bottom line is that Syria’s only conception of its relationship to Lebanon is complete brutal domination, where Syria decides every single minutiae of Lebanese life, including who gets to be president, prime minister, speaker, Army Commander, security officials, election law, cabinet make-up, cabinet portfolios, cabinet policy statement, etc.”

His site tends to see- and not without cause- Syrian involvement in everything that happens in Lebanon. The Daily Star has an interesting piece about how this is the first killing that hasn’t involved someone overtly anti-Syrian, but that doesn’t totally discount Bey’s thesis. Indeed, it could support it, if one thinks that the over-arching Syrian objective is a display of brutal, unhesitant strength.

Though Bey’s blog tends to be a little strident, it is with good cause- there are few things that happen in Lebanon in which Syria doesn’t play a role. However, a fascinating article in MERIP from over the summer suggests that the crisis with Fatah al-Islam came not from too many Syrians, but from the lack of them. It argues that for years all Lebanese politics tended to revolve around the Syrian security apparatus which stifled Lebanon. The Syrian withdrawal changed all the rules, or at least altered them. The article focuses mainly on the Palestinians in refugee camps, and the radical groups inside of the. One of the points it makes is that Fatah al-islam was not a Palestinian group- just one operating in the squalor of the Nahr al-Barid camp. It draws their source of revenue and operational abilities to anyone from the Syrians to their sworn enemy, the Hariri clan (the latter being part of an effort for Sunnis to strike back against a rising Shi’ite tide).

The author admits this may or may not be true. The article is full of speculation and drawing connections, some of which are fascinating simply because they appeal to the conspiracy-loving mind in all of us. It is informed speculation, though, and important for a major reason: even if none of it proves to be true there are many in Lebanon who assuredly already believe similar ideas. And, in life- but especially in the Middle East- perception is reality. The factions, even as they try to hammer out a constitutional solution to the crisis, are staring at each other across a chasm of rumor and barbed wire, of fear and innuendo. In this, the mere thought that your friend may be in bed with your enemy could be enough to send Lebanon spiraling back into its familiar hell.

 Brig. Gen. François al-Hajj, who was on the track to succeed Michel Suleiman as Army chief of staff whenever he becomes president, was killed in a car bomb in Beirut today.   Al-Hajj also led the battle against the Fatah al-Islam militant group in ferocious fighting last summer.   Whether this was a revenge killing or somehow tied to the frustrating and increasingly dangerous political void (or both) is unsure as of now.  Al-Jazeera postulates that this is a “significant unfolding of events because the army was the only military institution that is seen as neutral, and not taking sides in the political crisis in Lebanon.”  Of course, if Suleiman does become President, the line between civilian and military status in Lebanon will become increasingly blurred.

Ad nauseam, ad infinitum.  For the 8th time, the Lebanese parliament has postponed electing a president.   The many factions had agreed on choosing Gen. Michel Suleiman to replace Emil Lahoud, but it has hit many, many snags.  For one, the Lebanese constitution forbids high-ranking state employees from becoming President, so Suleiman will have to resign or the Constitution will have to be amended.  The constitution allows for that, but the opposition parties (notably Hezbollah) are opposed to that.  That link, from the excellent Daily Star, also describes in detail what the postponement is all about- essentially each side trying to get the most out of a comprehensive agreement on the shape of the next government.   For a good look at why things are so chaotic, read the latest entry in Michael Young’s blog.  It is fairly dizzying.  Hassan Naffa has a good article about Lebanon being the testing-ground of the Arab World in last week’s al-Ahram, and how the crisis “is not a constitutional one; it is one of consensus or, more accurately, the lack thereof.” 

At least 60 people have been killed as a result of two bombings in Algiers today- one near a government bulding and the other near United Nations offices.    The government is sure that the GSPC is responsible (The GSPC, a splinter of the GIA group which waged the civil war in the 1990s,  was known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, and now call themselves al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb).   However, recently, there has been chatter of another geographically-named Islamist group in Algeria,  the Organization of al-Qaeda in the Land of the Berbers.   The GSPC has been suffering defections and low morale, and this could be an operation to staunch a decline, or it could be the first blow of an upstart group.  These bombings fit the goals of the GSPC, which is to topple the secular Algerian government and attack Western targets, but these goals are not exclusive to them.  And  while it seems unlikely that a new group could pull off such a devastating attack, it is important to remember that this is battle-hardened Algeria, where even new-comers have long experience with war.   Paying attention to who is ultimately resposible for this attack will help illuminate whether Algeria is dealing with a single, focused group or a number of splintered factions, eager to prove their mettle.